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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in denying Advanced Shoring's pretrial motion for 
summary judgment seeking judgment as a matter of law that Plaintiffs cannot meet their 
burden to prove that Advanced Shoring breached its contract or warranty or that 
Advanced Shoring's breach caused Plaintiffs' damages without expert testimony, in a 
case involving complex allegations of improper geotechnical analysis and underpinning 
of residential construction, where Plaintiffs did not designate and would not present 
expert testimony at trial? 
Standard of review: Review for correctness, granting no deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions, and viewing the facts and reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Normandeau v. 
Hansen Equipment, Inc., 2009 UT 44, f9, 215 P.3d 152; Prince Yeates and Geldzahler v. 
Young, 2004 UT 26, ^ 10, 94 P.3d 179. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in the parties' briefing and oral argument 
regarding Advanced Shoring's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 39 at pp. 4-9.) 
2. Did the trial court err in denying motion for directed verdict made by 
Advanced Shoring at the close of Plaintiffs' case in chief on the basis that Plaintiffs failed 
to meet their burden to prove that Advanced Shoring caused Plaintiffs' damages without 
expert testimony, in a case involving complex allegations of improper geotechnical 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
analysis and underpinning of residential construction, where Plaintiffs did not present 
expert testimony at trial? 
Standard of review: "When reviewing the denial of a motion for involuntary 
dismissal, an appellate court should defer to the trial court's findings and inferences under 
a clearly erroneous standard and review the trial court's conclusions of law for 
correctness." Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT App 379, ^173 P.3d 865; Southern Title 
Guar. Co. v. Bethers, 761 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in oral argument on Advanced Shoring's 
motion for directed verdict at the close of Plaintiffs' case in chief. (R. 79 at pp. 114-116.) 
3. Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying Advanced Shoring's 
pretrial motion for summary judgment seeking judgment as a matter of law because 
Plaintiffs cannot recover direct or consequential damages for loss in value of their 
residence because they surrendered the residence in bankruptcy prior to trial and 
therefore did not own any interest in the property damaged? 
Standard of review: Review for correctness, granting no deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions, and viewing the facts and reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Normandeauv. 
Hansen Equipment, Inc., 2009 UT 44, TJ9, 215 P.3d 152; Prince Yeates and Geldzahler v. 
Young, 2004 UT 26, ^ [10, 94 P.3d 179. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in the parties' briefing and oral argument 
regarding Advanced Shoring's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 39 at pp. 1-4.) 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4. Did the trial court err in denying Advanced Shoring's pretrial motion for 
summary judgment seeking judgment as a matter of law on the basis that an enforceable 
warranty cannot be created by a single statement made by Advanced Shoring that "I 
won't guarantee it unless I get $10,000.00 more", but that rather such a statement is too 
indefinite to form an enforceable contract? 
Standard of review: Review for correctness, granting no deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions, and viewing the facts and reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Prince Yeates and 
Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, 94 P.3d 179; Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch, 955 P.2d 
357 (Utah App. 1998). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in the parties5 briefing and oral argument 
regarding Advanced Shoring's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 22 at pp. 1-5.) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of case and course of proceedings below 
This is a construction defect action filed by Plaintiffs as a result of foundation 
settling at the residence they formerly owned in LaVerkin, Utah. (R. 27 at pp. 1-2.) 
Plaintiffs filed this case on or about June 13, 2008, seeking recovery from Advanced 
Shoring for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, equitable estoppel, breach of 
warranty, and unjust enrichment/quantum meruit. (R. 1.) 
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After conducting discovery, Advanced Shoring first moved for summary judgment 
on or about November 30, 2009. (R. 21.) Advanced Shoring's motion was based (in 
part) on the fact on Plaintiffs' testimony that the sole basis for their breach of warranty 
claim is the statement "I won't guarantee it unless I get $10,000 more", which Plaintiffs 
allege was made by an employee of Advanced Shoring. (R. 22 at pp. 1-5.) Advanced 
Shoring argued that this statement, standing alone, was much too indefinite to form the 
basis for an enforceable contract or warranty. (R. 22 at pp. 1-5.) In a brief order issued 
on May 11, 2010, the trial court indicated that "[a]s the Court finds that certain areas of 
material fact, particularly those relating to the alleged "warranty," remain in dispute, 
summary judgment is not appropriate at this juncture." (R. 33.) 
After the expiration of expert discovery deadlines, Advanced Shoring filed a 
second motion for summary judgment, arguing that because Plaintiffs failed to designate 
an expert to testify on their behalf Plaintiffs could not meet their required burden of proof 
with respect to causation. (R. 39 at pp. 4-9.) Advanced Shoring also argued that 
Plaintiffs could not recover because they lost the Property as a result of their voluntary 
failure to make mortgage payments. (R. 39 at pp. 1-4.) Despite the agreement of the 
parties on the central facts applicable to these issues, the trial court again denied 
summary judgment on both arguments because of the existence of unspecified material 
disputes of fact. (See docket.) 
This case was tried to the bench from January 24 - 28, 2011. (R. 62, 67.) 
Advanced Shoring raised the issues that form the basis of the instant appeal both in 
renewed dispositive motions and in closing argument. (R. 79 at pp. 114-140, 80 at 60-
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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89.) Specifically, at the close of Plaintiffs' case in chief, Advanced Shoring made a 
motion for a directed verdict based on Plaintiffs' failure to present expert testimony 
required to prove that any act or omission by Advanced Shoring caused Plaintiffs' 
damages. (R. 79 at pp. 114-116.) Advanced Shoring's motion was denied. (R. 79 at p. 
140.) At the conclusion of trial the Court found for Plaintiffs on the breach of warranty 
and breach of contract causes of action and dismissed Plaintiffs' other causes of action. 
(R. 80 at 89-101.) Plaintiffs have not cross-appealed the dismissal of their remaining 
causes of action. 
Facts 
The following facts were either admitted on summary judgment or undisputed at 
trial: 
Plaintiffs built a house on a lot located at 355 North 560 West in La Verkin, Utah 
(the "Property") in 2004. (R. 27 at pp. 1-2.) In 2006, Plaintiffs obtained a loan and 
executed a promissory note. (R. 39 at p. v; R. 44.) The promissory note was secured by 
the Property through a Deed of Trust. (R. 39 at p. v; R. 44.) Plaintiffs began to notice 
that the Property was settling two months after moving in. (R. 39 at p. v; R. 44.) 
Plaintiffs filed suit in Fifth District Court against their general contractor and 
several subcontractors who performed work on the Property. (R. 39 at p. v; R. 44.) 
Plaintiffs brought claims seeking recovery for damage to the Property due to sinking of 
the foundation. (R. 39 at p. v; R. 44.) Plaintiffs ultimately settled the litigation against 
the general contractor who built their house. (R. 39 at p. v; R. 44.) 
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After settling that litigation, Plaintiffs' attorney obtained a bid from Advanced 
Shoring to perform certain repairs on the Property. (R. 39 at p. v; R. 44.) Plaintiffs 
directed their attorney to execute a written contract with Advanced Shoring on their 
behalf. (R. 39 at p. vi; R. 44.) Advanced Shoring began work on the Property in early 
2006. (R. 39 at p. vi; R. 44.) After commencing work, Advanced Shoring learned that 
the condition of the Property was such that additional work and materials were needed to 
stabilize Plaintiffs' foundation. (R. 27 at p. 5.) Plaintiffs testified that Advanced 
Shoring's representative told Plaintiffs that "I won't guarantee it unless I get $10,000 
more." (R. 27 at pp. 5-6.) Plaintiffs authorized Advanced Shoring to perform the 
additional work, and paid approximately $8,700.00. (R. 39 at p. vi; R. 44.) 
Advanced Shoring performed work on the Property on more than one occasion, 
providing substantial work and materials in an attempt to stabilize the foundation. (R. 27 
at p. 4.) Advanced Shoring completed its work, and then was notified that the Property 
continued to sink. (R. 39 at p. vii; R. 44.) Advanced Shoring returned to the Property 
and performed substantial additional work in attempt to prevent the Property from 
sinking further. (R. 39 at p. vii; R, 44.) Ultimately, Advanced Shoring's efforts to 
prevent further sinking of the Property were unsuccessful. (R. 39 at p. vii; R. 44.) 
Beginning in June, 2009, Plaintiffs defaulted on the promissory note by failing to 
make required monthly payments. (R.. 39 at p. vii; R. 44.) Notice of Default and Election 
to Sell the Property was filed by the holder of the deed of trust on or about August 25, 
2009. (R. 39 at p. vii; R. 44.) On or about January 14, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a petition in 
the United States Bankruptcy Court in and for the District of Utah seeking protection 
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under chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. (R. 39 at p. vii; R. 44.) 
Documents filed with the bankruptcy court indicate that Plaintiffs filed for bankruptcy 
protection because they were no longer able to satisfy their obligations to numerous 
creditors. (R. 39 at p. viii; R. 44.) Additionally, Plaintiffs represented to the United 
States Trustee that Mr. Hone's inability to continue working after suffering a blood clot 
in his leg reduced Plaintiffs income substantially. (R. 39 at p. viii; R. 44.) Plaintiffs filed 
a sworn statement of financial affairs with the bankruptcy Court indicating that Plaintiffs 
intended to surrender the Property to the holder of the trust deed. (R. 39 at p. viii; R. 44.) 
On or about January 15, 2010, the holder of the deed of trust moved the bankruptcy court 
to lift the automatic stay to allow the holder to foreclose the deed of trust, as Plaintiffs 
were in default and had no equity interest in the Property. (R. 39 at p. viii; R. 44.) The 
bankruptcy court granted the motion on or about February 10, 2010. (R. 39 at p. viii; R. 
44.) Creditor then initiated a non-judicial foreclosure, which was completed by issuance 
of a trustee's deed on or about March 8, 2010. (R. 39 at p. viii; R. 44.) This trustee's 
deed transferred title to the Property to a buyer who purchased the Property at the 
trustee's sale. (R. 39 at p. viii-ix; R. 44.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant challenges the denial of two pretrial motions for summary judgments 
which presented arguments based on undisputed facts, and the denial of its motion for 
directed verdict made at the close of Plaintiffs' case in chief. Though the trial court 
denied these motions with largely cursory rulings indicating (in the case of the motions 
for summary judgment) that material issues of fact existed which precluded summary 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
judgment, these rulings were based entirely on undisputed facts - either testimony 
provided by Plaintiffs in deposition, the admitted failure of plaintiffs to retain an expert to 
testify in support of their claims, or the fact and effect of Plaintiffs' bankruptcy. In every 
case, the undisputed facts presented in Advanced Shoring's Motions did not materially 
change at trial. Therefore, the denial of these pretrial motions is properly challenged on 
appeal. 
The evidence presented by Plaintiffs was insufficient, as a matter of law, to 
survive summary judgment because they failed to designate an expert to testify on their 
behalf as to the elements of causation and breach. Plaintiffs tried their case primarily on 
the theories of breach of contract and breach of warranty, and the trial court's award was 
based on the breach of warranty theory only. However, each of these causes of action 
requires Plaintiffs to present evidence of breach and causation to recover. Determination 
of whether Advanced Shoring breached its contract with Plaintiffs or any warranty 
provided to Plaintiffs required analysis of the appropriateness of the geotechnical work 
performed by Advanced Shoring and whether any deficiency in Advanced Shoring's 
work caused Plaintiffs' damages. Due to the highly technical nature of Advanced 
Shoring's work, and the multiplicity of potential causes for the sinking of the Property, 
Plaintiffs were required to submit expert testimony in order to meet their burden. In 
response, Plaintiffs firmly represented that they did not intend to present expert 
testimony. Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to grant Advanced Shoring's Motion. 
At trial, Advanced Shoring again moved for dismissal on the basis that, without 
expert testimony, the Plaintiffs were unable to meet their burden of proof. Plaintiffs did 
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not present any expert testimony in support of their claims. However, the trial court 
denied the motion without specifying a reason for doing so. The trial court erred in 
denying Advanced Shoring's motion because the technical and complicated nature of 
Advanced Shoring's work and the myriad of factors that could have caused the Property 
to sink required Plaintiffs to present expert testimony in order to prove, beyond mere 
speculation that Advanced Shoring caused or contributed to Plaintiffs' damages. 
Advanced Shoring also sought summary judgment because Plaintiffs did not suffer 
any damages as a result of Advanced Shoring's conduct. The proper measure of contract 
or warranty damages is the amount necessary to "place the nonbreaching party in as good 
a position as if the contract had been performed." Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, \ 31, 
990 P.2d 933. In June of 2009, long after Advanced Shoring ceased working on the 
Property, Plaintiffs decided to stop making their mortgage payments, and predictably a 
secured creditor instituted foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiffs then filed for bankruptcy 
protection under chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. Advanced Shoring 
indisputably had no involvement in Plaintiffs' bankruptcy or their decision to cease 
making mortgage payments. The combination of surrendering the Property to secured 
creditors and the bankruptcy discharge reduced Plaintiffs' interest in the Property to zero. 
Given that Plaintiffs no longer own the Property, they are in the same position they would 
be in regardless of any breach of warranty or breach of contract by Advanced Shoring. 
Finally, the trial court erred in denying Advanced Shoring's motion for summary 
judgment on Plaintiffs' warranty claim because the language identified by Plaintiffs was 
insufficient to create a warranty as a matter of law. Plaintiffs repeatedly testified that the 
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sole basis for their belief that Advanced Shoring provided them with a warranty was the 
statement that "I won't guarantee it unless I get $10,000 more". Plaintiffs claimed that 
Advanced Shoring made this statement in the context of requesting payment for 
additional piers necessary to support the foundation of the Property. However, Advanced 
Shoring's statement does not actually promise or represent anything. Rather, it merely 
indicates that, if Plaintiffs would not pay for the additional work to be performed, no 
warranty could be provided. In contrast with the "direct and positive affirmation of fact" 
required by Utah law in order for a warranty to arise, Advanced Shoring's statement is far 
too indefinite to give rise to an enforceable warranty. SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, 
Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, % 21, 28 P.3d 669. It is, at best, either 
an offer to provide further construction services, or a hopelessly vague and indefinite 
agreement to agree, which lacks the basic requirements for enforcement as a matter of 
law. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. ADVANCED SHORING HAS PROPERLY CHALLENGED THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF PRETRIAL MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
a. The denial of a pretrial motion for summary judgment can be 
challenged on appeal where the denial was on purely legal grounds 
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that any time "that reasonable minds 
could not differ as to the conclusion to draw from the evidence or that the evidence 
adduced was simply insufficient to sustain the legal claim, then the trial court should rule 
on the issue as a matter of law." Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 2009 UT 44, 
f 15, 215 P.3d 152. The Court then held that "when a court denies a motion for summary 
judgment on a purely legal basis, that is where the court denies the motion based on the 
undisputed facts, rather than because of the existence of a disputed material fact, the party 
denied summary judgment may challenge that denial on appeal." Id. 
In this case, Advanced Shoring filed two separate motions for summary judgment. 
(R. 21; R. 39 at pp. 4-9.) The trial court denied each motion with a cursory statement that 
material issues of fact existed which precluded summary judgment. However, the claims 
raised herein on appeal were based on undisputed facts, and involved purely legal 
determinations regarding whether the evidence presented could sustain a ruling in favor 
of Plaintiffs as a matter of law. These facts did not materially change at trial. Therefore, 
despite the trial court's cursory contention that material issues of fact existed, it is clear 
that Advanced Shoring's motions raised purely legal questions, and that Advanced 
11 
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% 
Shoring is therefore entitled to appeal the trial court's denial of its motions for summary 
judgment. < 
b. Advanced Shoring's challenge to the pretrial denial of its motions 
for summary judgment is proper because the motions were based on 
undisputed facts and turned on purely legal rulings 
Appellants filed a motion for summary judgment in this case prior to trial on the 
basis that expert testimony was required to prove Plaintiffs' claims, and Plaintiffs failed 
to designate any expert witnesses to give testimony at trial. (R. 21; R. 39 at pp. 4-9.) The < 
facts supporting Appellant's argument, namely the nature of Plaintiffs' defect claims and 
Plaintiffs' refusal to designate an expert to testify relative to said defects, were 
undisputed. (R. 44.) Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that, due to Advanced Shoring's 
failure to properly perform its geotechnical and underpinning work, the Property 
continued to settle. (R. 44.) Moreover, the record undisputedly discloses that Plaintiffs 
never designated an expert to testify on their behalf, and Plaintiffs have repeatedly 
asserted that they had no intention of presenting expert testimony at trial. (R. 44.) 
"Whether expert testimony is required to prove an element of the plaintiffs prima 
facie case as a matter of law..." Fox v. Brigham Young Univ., 2007 UT App 406, ffi[ 14, 
21-23, 176 P.3d 446; see also Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency, 2009 UT App 347, ^ 20, 
222 P.3d 775. Therefore, the trial court's decision as to whether Plaintiffs' claims 
required them to present expert testimony, and thus to deny Advanced Shoring's motion 
for summary judgment, was a purely legal ruling, and is appropriately challenged on 
appeal. 
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In the same motion for summary judgment, Advanced Shoring challenged 
Plaintiffs' ability to recover for damage to the Property given that Plaintiffs voluntarily 
surrendered the Property in bankruptcy after deciding to stop making payments on their 
mortgage. (R. 39 at pp. 1-4.) Advanced Shoring's motion argued that Plaintiffs suffered 
no recoverable damages because Plaintiffs' lost the Property through their own choices 
and not as a result of any act or omission of Advanced Shoring. (R. 39.) Plaintiffs are in 
exactly the same position as if there were no breach, and thus Plaintiffs have no damages. 
The fact that Plaintiffs' voluntarily ceased making their mortgage payments and 
filed bankruptcy was clearly established by Plaintiffs bankruptcy filings, and was 
supported by testimony given by Plaintiffs at trial. (R. 39 at p. vii; R. 44; R. 78 at 108:10-
19.) There is no dispute that Advanced Shoring had not worked on the Property for more 
than a year at the time Plaintiffs stopped making their mortgage payments. (R. 39 at p. 
vii; R. 44.) These facts were undisputed, and did not materially change at trial. 
"Anytime 'that reasonable minds could not differ as to the conclusion to draw 
from the evidence or that the evidence adduced was simply insufficient to sustain the 
legal claim, then the trial court should rule on the issue as a matter of law.'" 
Normandeau, 2009 UT 44 at [^15 (quoting AMS Salt Indus., Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of 
Am., 942 P.2d 315, 320 (Utah 1997)). The facts of Plaintiffs' bankruptcy are undisputed 
and therefore resolution of Advanced Shoring's motion turned on a pure question of law, 
namely, whether reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusion to draw from the 
evidence that Plaintiffs voluntarily surrendered all interest in the Property to secured 
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creditors. The trial court's denial of Advanced Shoring's pretrial motion on this basis is 
appropriately challenged on appeal. 
Advanced Shoring's pretrial motion for summary judgment sought dismissal of 
Plaintiffs' breach of warranty claim because the statement on which this claim was based 
was too indefinite to constitute a warranty as a matter of law. (R. 22 at pp. 1-5.) 
Plaintiffs' alleged that Advanced Shoring told Lana Hone that "I won't guarantee it 
unless I get $10,000 more." (R. 27 at pp. 5-6.) Plaintiffs admitted that this statement is 
the sole basis for their breach of warranty claim. (R. 27 at pp. 5-6.) 
Advanced Shoring's motion argued that this statement could not, as a matter of 
law, constitute an enforceable warranty because it is not "a direct and positive affirmation 
of fact" and is so indefinite as to be unenforceable. See SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, 
Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, \ 21, 28 P.3d 669; Brown's Shoe Fit 
Co. v. Olch, 955 P. 2d 357, 363 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Resolution of Advanced Shoring's 
argument that no enforceable warranty exists turned on a pure question of law because 
the facts on which this claim was based were undisputed for purposes of the motion. The 
trial court's denial of Advanced Shoring's pretrial motion on this basis is therefore 
appropriately challenged on appeal. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF ADVANCED SHORING'S 
PRETRIAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
SUBSEQUENT MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD BE REVERSED 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS COULD NOT PROVE THEIR CLAIMS 
WITHOUT EXPERT TESTIMONY, AND PLAINTIFFS NEVER 
DESIGNATED AN EXPERT. 
a. Plaintiffs' claims require proof of causation and standard of care 
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges five causes of action: breach of contract, breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent misrepresentation, unjust 
enrichment/quantum meruit, and breach of warranty. (R. 1.) Of those five causes of 
action, four—breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of warranty—all require some showing 
of proximate cause. Advanced Shoring's pretrial motion sought dismissal of each of the 
claims based on Plaintiffs' inability to prove causation without an expert. (R. 22.) 
Each of the Plaintiffs' claims required the trial court to determine the 
appropriateness of Advanced Shoring's geotechnical work in evaluating and 
underpinning the Property, and whether any deficiencies in that work caused Plaintiffs' 
damages. Under Utah law, there appears to be no distinction between causation in the 
context of contract-based versus negligence-based claims. For example, an essential 
element of an action for breach of contract is a showing that the breach caused the 
plaintiffs damages. Thurston v. Workers Comp. Fund of Utah, 2003 UT App 438, f 21, 
83 P.3d 391. As the Utah Supreme Court recognized in Thurston, "[Djamages are not 
recoverable for losses suffered . . . unless the requirements of the law as to 'proximate' 
causation are satisfied. The form of this rule is the same whether it is being applied in the 
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field of contracts or in the field of torts." Id. at \ 23 (quoting 5 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin 
on Contracts § 997 (interim ed. 1964)) (alterations in original). The same rule applies to 
actions for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Crookston 
v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 793 (Utah 1991); Thomas Am. Stone & Bldg.y Inc. v. 
White, 142 B.R. 449, 453 (D. Utah 1992). Similarly, a claim for negligent 
misrepresentation requires a showing that "the misrepresentation is the legal cause" of the 
damages suffered. Forsberg v. Burningham & Kimball, 892 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). "Proof of proximate cause is also required in breach of warranty actions . . . ." 
Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Utah 1996). 
As the Thurston court noted, evidence of causation is always necessary in order to 
avoid summary judgment, even in breach of contract actions. Thurston, 2003 Utah App 
438 at f^ll 18, 23. Thurston involved a breach of contract action brought against a home 
health-care company by the family of a disabled man after he was found dead under 
suspicious circumstances. Thurston, 2003 UT App 438 at % 6. The family alleged that 
the man had committed suicide as a result of the company's failure to monitor his mental 
health and growing dependency on drugs and alcohol. Id. This Court upheld the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the company, noting that "due to the 
unusual circumstances and lack of direct evidence surrounding Thurston's death, the jury 
would need some assistance in making the connection between the conduct of Defendants 
and the death of Thurston." Id. at <| 18. Since the plaintiffs expert testimony was 
excluded, "[s]ummary judgment was appropriate due to the lack of evidence concerning 
the proximate cause of Thurston's death." Id. at \ 20. This was true even though some of 
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the plaintiffs' claims were for breach of contract, since "Defendants' acts, whether 
breaches of contract or torts, must be causally linked to Plaintiffs1 damages." Id. at f 23. 
b. Plaintiffs' claims required expert testimony in order to prove breach 
and causation, and Plaintiffs did not designate any experts. 
Expert testimony is often necessary to "establish the standard of care required in 
cases dealing with the duties owed by a particular profession, especially where the 
average person has little understanding of the duties owed by the particular profession at 
issue, or the case involves complex allegations." Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency, 
2009 UT App 347, %L\, 222 P.3d 775 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Engineering issues of a technical nature are considered beyond the scope of common 
knowledge and require expert testimony. See Warenski, 2011 UT App 197 at ^[11; cf. 
Preston & Chambers, P.C. v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (noting the 
requirement of expert testimony regarding the standard of care for "cases involving 
medical doctors, architects, and engineers") (quoting Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 
821, 826 n. 8 (Utah. Ct. App. 1989)) (emphasis added). 
Specifically, expert testimony is required to prove causation if the issues involved 
"are beyond an ordinary lay person's knowledge, necessitating speculation in making a 
finding " Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 2000 UT App 285, f 16, 12 P.3d 1015 (quoting 
Riggins v. Bechtel Power Corp., 722 P.2d 819, 824 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986)); see also 
Warenski v. Advanced RVSupply, 2011 UT App 197, f 11, — P.3d — . For example, in 
the medical malpractice context, expert testimony is required unless causation of the 
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alleged injury is "obvious to a layperson." Florez v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 2010 UT 
App 254,1(19, 240 P.3d 107. 
As this Court recently made clear in Warenski, "when the circumstances and the 
probabilities as to the causative factors of an accident lie within the ken of experts, expert 
evidence is necessary to establish a foundation that gives rise to an inference of 
negligence." Warenski, 2011 UT App 197 at ^10 (quoting King v. Searle Pharm., Inc., 
832 P.2d 858, 862 (Utah 1992)). 
Warenski involved a claim against a repair shop for an alleged failure to properly 
inspect and repair a tie rod on the plaintiffs all-terrain vehicle. Id. at Tf 2. In that case, 
the Court held that expert testimony was required to show both breach and causation, 
noting that "the average person would not be knowledgeable about how a tie rod is 
properly installed, what dangers may result if the tie rod is not properly installed, or how 
a tie rod could become disconnected." Id. at ^[11. Since no admissible expert testimony 
was provided, this Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor 
the defendant. Id. at ^ 14; see also Fox v. Brigham Young Univ., 2007 UT App 406, K 22, 
176 P.3d 446 ("It is only in 'the most obvious cases' that a plaintiff may be excepted 
from the requirement of using expert testimony to prove causation.") (quoting Beard, 
2000 UT App 285 at ^ 16). 
Plaintiffs bore the burden of proving that their damages were caused by Advanced 
Shoring5s acts or omissions. And like the plaintiffs in Thurston, Plaintiffs were required 
to produce expert testimony in order to establish that Advanced Shoring's conduct, rather 
than any of the many other possible causes, caused their home to sink—which, 
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incidentally, it was already doing well before Advanced Shoring ever arrived on the site. 
(R. 39 at p. v; R. 44.) However, Plaintiffs did not present any expert testimony in response 
to Advanced Shoring's motion. 
Plaintiffs cannot prove why this sinking occurred or what Advanced Shoring did 
that caused or contributed to its continued sinking. In fact, in response to Advanced 
Shoring's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs did not even present evidence of what 
work Advanced Shoring performed. (R. 44.) In fact, prior to filing the instant litigation, 
Plaintiffs filed and subsequently settled a lawsuit against other parties which they claimed 
were responsible for the sinking of the Property. (R. 39 at p. v; R. 44.) Plaintiffs were 
certainly aware that the sinking could have been caused by someone or something 
besides Advanced Shoring. (R. 39 at p. v; R. 44.) In the face of such uncertainty on 
causation, Plaintiffs were and are under the obligation to produce competent evidence 
linking Advanced Shoring's conduct to the sinking of the home. In a case involving 
complex questions about the soils underlying the home and other geotechnical factors, 
such testimony could only be provided by an expert. 
Plaintiffs contend that Advanced Shoring improperly placed helical piers and ram 
or grouted piers under the Property, causing the Property to continue sinking and 
therefore lose value. (R. 1.) This theory surely requires expert testimony. An average lay 
person is not familiar with how helical piers work, the types of soil on which a helical 
pier can be successfiilly placed, the factors that can cause a house to sink despite proper 
placement of helical piers, or what factors could cause the Property to sink despite proper 
installation of pier systems. Geotechnical engineering is at least as complex as repairing 
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a tie rod on an ATV, which this Court held in Warenski required expert testimony to 
prove breach and causation. Accordingly, Plaintiffs were required to produce expert 
testimony on these issues here as well. Plaintiffs' failure to designate an expert is 
therefore fatal to their claims, and the trial court should have granted Advanced Shoring's 
pretrial motion for summary judgment. 
c. The trial court erred in denying Advanced Shoring's motion to 
dismiss because Plaintiffs' failed to meet their burden to prove breach or 
causation in their case in chief. 
At the close of Plaintiffs' case in chief, Advanced Shoring moved for a directed 
verdict on Plaintiffs' claims on the basis that Plaintiffs' had failed to meet their burden to 
prove breach or causation because Plaintiffs did not present expert testimony. (R. 79 at 
pp. 114-116.) "Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for a directed verdict 
submitted during a bench trial is treated as a motion for involuntary dismissal." 
Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT App 379, [^13, 173 P.3d 865; Grossen v. DeWitt, 1999 UT 
App 167,^8-9, 982 P.2d 581. 
As noted above, engineering issues of a technical nature are considered beyond the 
scope of common knowledge and require expert testimony. See Warenski, 2011 UT App 
197 at TJ11; cf. Preston & Chambers, P.C v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). Specifically, expert testimony is required to prove causation if the issues involved 
"are beyond an ordinary lay person's knowledge, necessitating speculation in making a 
finding " Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 2000 UT App 285, ^|16, 12 P.3d 1015 (quoting 
Riggins v. Bechtel Power Corp., 722 P.2d 819, 824 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986)); see also 
Warenski v. Advanced RVSupply, 2011 UT App 197, ^ 11, — P.3d — . 
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Plaintiffs did not designate any expert witnesses to give testimony at trial. This 
court has previously held that "[a] party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any 
person who may be used at trial to present evidence under [rjules 702, 703, or 705 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence." Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303, f 12, 141 P.3d 629. 
Failure to comply with this rule bars the witness from giving expert opinions at trial. See 
Ai at 1(14. 
While Plaintiffs attempted to elicit expert testimony from several witnesses at trial, 
for the most part such testimony was excluded. While the Court did allow Plaintiffs to 
ask Per Danfors, president of Advanced Shoring for his expert opinion regarding 
Advanced Shoring5s work on the Property, Mr. Danfors testified that Advanced Shoring 
did its job properly. (R. 77 at pp. 118:2-16.) Mr. Danfors also testified that he did not 
know why the Property continued to sink. (R. 77 at pp. 136:6-11.) He further testified 
that the Property could continue to sink for reasons unconnected with anything Advanced 
Shoring did or failed to do. (R. 77 at pp. 203:5-204:4.) Plaintiffs did not elicit (and the 
Court did not admit into evidence) any expert testimony supporting their claim that 
Advanced Shoring performed its work improperly or that an act or omission by 
Advanced Shoring caused or contributed to Plaintiffs' damages. 
Plaintiffs did not meet their burden to prove the elements of causation or breach by 
expert testimony. Plaintiffs' claims should therefore have been dismissed. This court has 
noted that "[a] plaintiff who otherwise deserves to lose is simply not entitled to a shot at 
proving his case on cross-examination or at having the adverse party bumble into proving 
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it for him." Grossen, 1999 UT App 167 at [^9. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying 
Advanced Shoring's motion, and the trial court's ruling should be reversed. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF ADVANCED SHORING'S 
PRETRIAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE 
REVERSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO SUFFER ANY 
DAMAGES AS A RESULT OF ADVANCED SHORING'S 
CONDUCT, 
The proper measure of damages in a breach of contract action is the amount 
necessary to "place the nonbreaching party in as good a position as if the contract had 
been performed." Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ^ 31, 990 P.2d 933 (quoting 
Anesthesiologists Assoc, v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 884 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Utah 1994)). 
Thus, where the party is in the same position it would have been in absent the breach, it 
can recover no damages. See Id.; Missouri Baptist Hosp. v. United States, 555 F.2d 290, 
296-97 (Ct. CI. 1977). This principle is in harmony with the basic purpose of contract 
damages, which is to make the plaintiff whole; a measure of damages that punishes the 
defendant or provides the plaintiff with a windfall is inappropriate. See TruGreen Cos., 
L.L.C. v. Mower Bros., Inc., 2008 UT 81, ^ 23, 199 P.3d 929 (quoting Am. Air Filter Co. 
v. McNichol, 527 F.2d 1297, 1300 (3d Cir. 1975)). 
Although Utah courts have held that a property owner may recover damages for 
construction defects even if he or she no longer owns the home at issue, the owner must 
still demonstrate that he or she actually suffered damages. See Mitchell v. Stewart, 581 
P.2d 564 (Utah 1978). In Mitchell, the plaintiffs discovered several defects in a home 
they had purchased. Id. at 564. After selling the home for more than they had paid, they 
filed suit against the builder based on the defects. Id. The court held that the plaintiffs 
22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
were not barred from recovery simply because they no longer owned the home, noting 
that "[i]f they suffered compensable damage, it would make no difference whether or not 
they still owned the house." Id. at 564-65. This was true, the court reasoned, because the 
house could have sold for even more if the defects had not been present. See Id. 
Like the plaintiffs in Mitchell, Plaintiffs here are no longer the owners of the home 
at issue. But that is where the similarities end. Unlike the parties in Mitchell, Plaintiffs 
chose to abandon the mortgage on their home and allow it to fall into foreclosure. As 
Plaintiffs' own documents show, this decision was based on factors unrelated to 
Advanced Shoring's conduct. Thus, unlike the Mitchell plaintiffs, Plaintiffs in this case 
cannot show that the value of the home differs in any way as a result of any act or 
omission of Advanced Shoring. Plaintiffs made a conscious decision to cease making 
their mortgage payments due to financial difficulties they suffered because of Mr. Hone's 
health. In doing so, Plaintiffs independently reduced their interest in the residence to 
zero. In other words, the value of the property to Plaintiffs now is the same as it would 
have been absent any alleged breach of contract or warranty. Plaintiffs are in precisely 
the same position they would have been in if there had been no breach. Therefore, 
Plaintiffs' have no contract damages and cannot recover for any "lost value" in the 
property. Any loss they have suffered is due to their own actions, not Advanced 
Shoring's. Cf. Haymond v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 2004 UT 27, ^ 7, 89 
P.3d 171 (no standing to sue where plaintiffs alleged injuries were "largely self-
inflicted"). The trial court erred in denying Advanced Shoring's pretrial motion for 
summary judgment on this basis. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF ADVANCED SHORING'S 
PRETRIAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE 
REVERSED BECAUSE THE STATEMENT "I WON'T 
GUARANTEE IT UNLESS I GET $10,000.00 MORE", STANDING 
ALONE, CANNOT CREATE AN ENFORCEABLE WARRANTY 
CONTRACT 
a. Advanced Shoring's alleged statement to Plaintiffs is too indefinite 
to give rise to an express warranty or indeed any enforceable contract as a 
matter of law 
Normal principles of contract interpretation apply to the interpretation of an 
express warranty. See Orlob v. Wasatch Med. Mgmt., 2005 UT App 430, ^ 32, 124 P.3d 
269. As Utah courts have consistently held, "An agreement cannot be enforced if its 
terms are indefinite." Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37, 1 11, 78 P.3d 600 (quoting 
Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996)). In other words, "if the 
essential terms are so uncertain that there is no basis for deciding whether the agreement 
has been kept or broken, there is no contract." Id. at \ 12 (quoting Acad. Chicago 
Publishers v. Cheever, 578 N.E.2d 981, 984 (111. 1991)); see also Prince, Yeates & 
Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, \ 17, 94 P.3d 179. 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously held that a contract to purchase insurance 
cannot be enforced unless "the scope of the risk, the subject matter to be covered, the 
duration of the insurance, and other elements" can somehow be determined. Harris v. 
Albrecht, 2004 UT 13, K 11, 86 P.3d 728 (quoting Hamacher v. Tumy, 352 P.2d 493, 497 
(Or. I960)). Harris involved a business owner who had called his insurance agent and 
asked him "to place business and fire coverage on [his] equipment and the contents [of 
his office]." Id. at \ 5 (alterations in original). Although the agent stated that "he would 
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take care of [it]" and "come out and look at [the] equipment," no insurance was ever 
obtained. Id. (alterations in original). In affirming the district court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the agent, the court stated that "negotiations will not ripen into a 
contract until the parties arrive at an agreement as to all of the elements which are 
essential to an insurance contract, including the subject matter to be covered, the risk 
insured against, the amount of the indemnity, the duration of the coverage and the 
premium." Id. at f^ 10. Since the agent had no information regarding any of these critical 
issues, the court refused to imply even a contract to purchase insurance at a later date. Id. 
a t f l 8 . 
Although the present case deals with an alleged express warranty rather than an 
insurance contract, the principles stated in Harris apply here also. For purposes of 
Advanced Shoring's motion for summary judgment, it was undisputed that an Advanced 
Shoring employee told Plaintiff Lana Hone that "I won't guarantee it unless I get $10,000 
more." (R. 27 at pp. 5-6.) "Express warranties presuppose that the parties have entered 
into some kind of contractual agreement, and arise out of promises by the warrantor 
guaranteeing or assuri ng a specific result. SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, 
Stainback & Associates, Inc., 2001 UT 54, 28 P.3d 669. Conversely, Advanced 
Shoring's statement does not assure a specific result. Neither does this statement 
constitute "an assurance by one party to a contract of the existence of a fact upon which 
the other party may rely." Id. at «[fl8. In fact, it contains none of the defining terms of a 
warranty—what is being warranted or promised, what the warranty covers, how long it 
lasts, and so forth. The trial court's ruling essentially presupposes that Advanced Shoring 
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was providing an unlimited and indefinite warranty that the Property would never sink 
again, regardless of what the cause would be. Like the defective insurance contract in 
Harris, Advanced Shoring5 s alleged warranty simply has too many holes to be 
enforceable. 
In response, Plaintiffs may argue that that Advanced Shoring's statement could be 
interpreted to give rise to a contract to provide a warranty in the future. However, this 
statement, and Plaintiffs' subsequent payment for additional materials, can at best 
constitute a hopelessly indefinite agreement to agree. That is, such an argument leads to 
the conclusion that perhaps Advanced Shoring and Plaintiffs agreed, because of 
additional work would be performed and paid for, Advanced Shoring would still be able 
to offer them a warranty in the future. Although an agreement to agree is not 
unenforceable per se, such an agreement must "containf] provisions otherwise capable of 
enforcement . . . ." Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch, 955 P. 2d 357, 363 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998). In other words, an agreement to agree, like any contract, "can be enforced by the 
courts only if the obligations of the parties are set forth with sufficient definiteness that it 
can be performed." Id. (quoting Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962)). 
Olch involved a dispute over the enforceability of a preliminary lease agreement 
that included general guidelines for determining the rent to be paid but omitted a critical 
term that was to be inserted into the agreed-upon formula. Id. at 360. There, this Court 
held that the agreement was unenforceable, noting that "an option to renew a lease is 
unenforceable unless the rent to be paid, or some mechanism for determining the amount 
of rent, is specified in the lease." Id. at 364. Accordingly, as the Court recognized, 
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"where the conditions of the deferred contract are not set out in the provisional one, or 
where material conditions are omitted, it is not a contract in praesenti because the minds 
of the parties have not met and may never meet." Id. at 363 (quoting Chu v. Ronstadt, 
498 P.2d 560, 563 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972)) (emphasis added). Notably, the court was not 
swayed by the fact that the plaintiff, based on the preliminary lease agreement, had 
"moved ahead feeling that [he] had an agreement for a lease for a location." Id. at 360. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[a] condition precedent to the enforcement 
of any contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be 
spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness to be enforced." 
Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428-429 (Utah 1961). In Valcarce, the parties had 
engaged in substantial negotiations over the sale of some mink. Id. at 427. The buyer 
received a certain number of the mink, and exchange gave the seller a check. Id. The 
buyer later gave the seller a promissory note for a substantial sum. Id. The seller argued 
that the promissory note was merely additional payment for the mink already transferred. 
Id. The buyer argued that the promissory note was to pay for a side deal the parties had 
discussed. Id. The terms of this side deal were not spelled out with any specificity. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court noted that "[u]nder the circumstances shown to exist here, 
where there was simply some nebulous notion in the air that a contract might be entered 
into in the future, the court cannot fabricate the kind of a contract the parties ought to 
have made and enforce it." Id. at 428-429. 
Under the rules stated in Harris, Olch and Valcarce, the Plaintiffs' breach of 
warranty and breach of contract claims fail for the simple reason that Advanced 
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Shoring's statement was too indefinite to be enforceable. Even assuming there was an 
agreement to provide a warranty, Advanced Shoring's statement did not include critical 
terms—the content and scope of the warranty. Nothing in Advanced Shoring's alleged 
statement indicated which future events would be warranted against, which portions of 
the work would be covered, what Advanced Shoring's work would be or do for the 
Property, how long the warranty would last, or any other terms that would affect 
Advanced Shoring's ability to plan for and carry out the warranty. Just as the Olch court 
was unable to enforce the agreement absent a price term, the law does not allow the trial 
court to simply create a warranty out of whole cloth. Rather, a "warranty" which does 
not give any indication of what it consists of or what it covers is unenforceable as a 
matter of law. Just as the subjective feelings of the plaintiff in Olch could not, standing 
alone, give substance to a defective contract, in this case Plaintiffs' subjective belief 
regarding the scope of this warranty is irrelevant. (R. ) 
Similarly, Nielsen v. Gold's Gym involved a commercial lease agreement that went 
sour after the parties failed to agree on who should be responsible for necessary 
improvements to the leased building. Nielsen, 2003 UT 37 at \ 3. The initial contract 
signed by the parties referred only to the lessor's responsibility to develop the 
"premises"—a term that the lessor argued could not include post-construction 
improvements that had not been contemplated at the time the agreement was signed. Id. 
at K 9. The Utah Supreme Court, holding that no agreement had been reached as to the 
improvements, noted that the lessor's argument "serve[d] only to reinforce the absence of 
mutual assent as to the one issue that eventually terminated this relationship." Id. at ^ 10. 
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As the court recognized, "The court must be able to enforce the contract according to the 
parties1 intentions; if those intentions are impenetrable, or never actually existed, there 
can be no contract to enforce." Id. at f^ 12. 
The Utah Supreme Court reached a similar result in Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler 
v. Young, which involved an attorney hired by a law firm. Young, 2004 UT 26 at f 2. In 
the course of joining the firm Young was told of the firm's practice of awarding bonus 
compensation based on performance. Id. He was also told that attorneys with his level of 
experience could usually expect to become partners within two to three years. Id. 
Afterwards, when it became apparent that the attorney would be receiving a large fee on a 
contingent case, he began negotiating with the firm as to how the fee would be divided. 
Id. at f 5. In the course of those negotiations, both parties repeatedly promised "to be 
'fair' with each other in attempting to determine the amount of 'fair and equitable' 
compensation" that would be received. Id. However, after these negotiations broke down 
due to his insistence on being made a partner and given an increased salary, the attorney 
sued the firm for breach of contract. Id. at ff 6-7. 
The court held that no contract had been entered into between the attorney and the 
firm, since there had been no representation "that the firm would pay him a specific 
amount of additional compensation in the future, or that [the attorney] was guaranteed to 
become a shareholder. Furthermore, [the firm] never provided, nor did [the attorney] ask 
for, clarification on what exactly constituted 'performance' sufficient to trigger increased 
compensation." Id. at ^ 13. This was true despite the fact that the firm had indicated its 
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intention to be "fair," since "no agreement was ever reached on the integral feature of the 
alleged contract—[the attorney's] compensation." Id. at ^ 17. 
The indefinite nature of Advanced Shoring's alleged statement is similarly fatal to 
Plaintiffs' claims here. According to Lana Hone's testimony presented at summary 
judgment, an Advanced Shoring employee told her, "I won't guarantee it unless I get 
$10,000 more." Noticeably absent from that statement is any indication as to what is 
being guaranteed—that the work will be completed, that it will be completed according 
to the usual professional standards, that it will be free of defects, that it will fix the 
problems with the home, or any other even remotely specific statement. The only expert 
to testify in this matter indicated that such a warranty would be unreasonable. (R. 77 at 
pp. 203:5-204:4.) Thus, like the alleged contract in Young, this purported warranty is 
missing several essential terms, including most importantly, any fact or promise that is 
being warranted. Accordingly, it simply was not possible for any reasonable person, 
including Plaintiffs or the trial court, to tell what the alleged warranty was or whether it 
was breached. This "warranty" is therefore unenforceable as a matter of law, and 
summary judgment should have been granted. 
b. Advanced Shoring's alleged statement is, at best, a mere offer to 
provide services which cannot, as a matter of law, be a warranty of a 
specific result. 
In order for an express warranty to be created, there must be "a 'direct and positive 
affirmation of fact' made by the warrantor with regard to the quality or condition of the 
goods or services provided, i.e., an affirmation of fact guaranteeing or assuring a specific 
result." SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, 
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f 21, 28 P.3d 669 (quoting Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 606 (Utah 1983)) 
(emphasis added). A mere agreement to provide services does not create a warranty, 
since it is not a "guarantee^ that the services provided [will] be free from defects or 
inaccuracies." Id. In other words, an express warranty (as the term "express" makes 
obvious) cannot be implied merely from the fact that goods or services are being 
delivered. 
The Utah Supreme Court made this point clear in SME, which involved a contract 
with an architectural firm to provide plans for a construction project. SME, 2001 UT 54 
at T{2. After construction was begun, the structural steel fabricator for the project 
encountered numerous difficulties and delays, which it claimed were due to faulty 
designs by the architects. Id. at [^4. The fabricator sued on the basis of several provisions 
in the contract which the fabricator claimed constituted express warranties that the 
architects' work would be free of defects; these included promises to act "in full 
compliance with the latest applicable codes," to "set[] forth in detail the work to be 
accomplished," to be responsible for "any necessary changes to . . . designs, drawings 
and specifications" as well as "all of its professional negligent acts," and to do its work 
"accurately and timely in accordance with industry standards." Id. at f 19. 
The Court disagreed and held that these promises did not "set[] forth express 
warranties guaranteeing that the services provided would be free from defects or 
inaccuracies." Id. at | 21 . This was true, the court reasoned, because although the 
provisions included promises to follow building codes and industry standards, they did 
not "guarantee, assure, or warrant a specific result." Id. (emphasis added). As the court 
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recognized, "[t]o hold otherwise would essentially turn every basic contractual promise, 
duty, or obligation . . . into a warranty under which [the party] would be strictly liable, 
despite the 'exercise of all reasonable or even all possible care.'" Id. (quoting Groen, 667 
P.2d at 604); see also Boud v. SDNCO, Inc., 2002 UT 83, % 13, 54 P.3d 1131 ("[T]o be 
relied upon as a promise, a statement [constituting a warranty] must be highly specific or 
definite."). 
The distinction that was made in SME is likewise applicable to this case. Plaintiffs 
allege that the statement made by Advanced Shoring constitutes a warranty that the 
Plaintiffs' house will stop sinking. However, this statement is not a "direct affirmation of 
fact. . . guaranteeing or assuring a specific result" as required under SME. Plaintiffs do 
not allege that Advanced Shoring made a specific representation regarding the results of 
its work. Even when looked at in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, this statement at 
most indicates that additional funds were necessary in order for the work to be 
completed. In other words, Advanced Shoring was merely agreeing to provide services, 
not a warranty. 
Furthermore, under the SME standard, a statement creating a warranty must be a 
"direct and positive affirmation of fact . . . " SME, 2001 UT 54 at H 21 (quoting Groen, 
667 P.2d at 606) (emphasis added). Here, Advanced Shoring's alleged statement is 
insufficient as a matter of law to create a warranty, for the simple reason that it is not a 
positive affirmation of a fact. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, 
Advanced Shoring stated that, unless additional funds were provided, a warranty would 
not be given. A statement that, unless a condition is met, an event definitely will not 
32 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
happen in the future is not equivalent to a statement that an event will happen upon the 
meeting of a condition. In other words, Advanced Shoring told Plaintiffs that they would 
have to expend additional funds if they wanted to keep alive the possibility of receiving a 
warranty at a later date. Plaintiffs' payment to Advanced Shoring was consideration for 
the promise that this possibility would remain in place, not that it would become definite. 
Accordingly, there is no enforceable express warranty, and summary judgment should 
have been granted on that issue. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellant Advanced Shoring respectfully requests 
the Court reverse the trial court's denial of summary judgment and remand this matter for 
entry of judgment in favor of Appellant. 
DATED this 12th day of September, 2011. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Gabriel K. White 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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1 I the contracts and given the Hones more than twice the value that 
2 they originally bargained for. Plaintiffs have not met their 
3 I burden in this case, and we would ask the Court for a verdict of 
4 I no cause of action and for an award of taxable costs. 
5 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. Ladies and gentlemen, I 
6 address my comments to the courtroom in general as well as to the 
7 parties because you have seen each attorney approach the bench, 
8 and in time honored fashion begin their remarks with, "May it 
9 please the Court.'' That particular phrase probably goes back 
10 into the midst of time in Anglo-American jurisprudence, somewhere 
11 way across the pond in jolly old England it was probably first 
12 said. 
13 I have to take the time and the comment at this point 
14 to note that indeed Counsel, it does please the Court. I am 
15 particularly on this day proud to be a lawyer, because ladies and 
16 gentlemen, what you've seen here today is the use in a highly 
17 civilized, highly intellectual, very careful and very precise 
18 work by two well prepared, well trained and experienced lawyers 
19 to bring an important matter before the Court -- important to 
20 both sides — for a sensible and reasonable resolution, and this 
21 resolution will be done under law. 
22 Nobody is going to have to go to the streets. Tanks 
23 won't roll. Nobody is going to have to go take the hunting rifle 
24 off the wall. It's done in a civilized reasonable fashion, and 
25 that frankly, is the reason we all give thanks to a jurisdiction 
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1 much above this Court's for living in this country in this day, 
2 and why I have the particular joy of practicing before very 
3 capable lawyers my profession. 
4 What has come before the Court is the conclusion of a 
5 very sad story. Apart from the facts and the numbers and the 
6 pictures and the cracks and the trips back and forth between Salt 
7 Lake and La Verkin and all the depositions and the discovery and 
8 all the problems that these people have undergone, there is a 
9 heartache here that I have to be honest with everybody involved, 
10 I cannot cure. Only time will get you over this. No award of 
11 compensation or lack of award of compensation will make it any 
12 better. 
13 The law does not provide a particularly good solution 
14 for these types of life changing experiences. All I can tell 
15 you -- and this is from personal experience, because I, too, have 
16 been a litigant -- it will pass, and eventually it will be over, 
17 and you'll go on enjoying your lives doing the things that you 
18 like to do, and this will fade. I hope for everyone that that is 
19 sooner rather than later. 
20 It's my responsibility as a trial judge after the 
21 conclusion of a case like this to find certain facts and to make 
22 conclusions of law and a judgment according to the application of 
23 the law as it see it and the facts before me. 
24 This case is about a contract and a warranty. The key 
25 issue to this case, as is in often many, many cases can easily be 
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1 I written on a sticky pad like the one I have in front of me, and 
2 the question is was this work by Advanced Shoring warranted under 
3 all the facts and circumstances in this case. Well, the Court 
4 specifically finds that there was a written contract entered 
5 into between Advanced Shoring and the Hones by their attorney, 
6 Mr. Boyack, who was the signatory of that contract in behalf of 
7 the Hones. He was given that responsibility, and he fulfilled 
8 that responsibility in retaining Advanced Shoring. 
9 I As the contract progressed in its execution payments 
10 were made, invoices were sent and then an event occurred which 
11 is pivotal in the resolution of this case. That event was that 
12 telephone call testified to by Mrs. Hone. Up until that time the 
13 Court specifically finds that the advertisement brochure left on 
14 the counter at the home was probably not sufficient to establish 
15 a warranty. It was interesting in the fact that warranties at 
16 least were something that Advanced Shoring discussed in their 
17 course of business and maybe have some impact according to the 
18 findings that the Court's going to make later on. 
19 The Court was stricken powerfully by what Mrs. Hone has 
20 described as the fateful call. I have been doing this — I have 
21 been in the trial courtrooms of the State of Utah for an excess 
22 of 36 years now. I was particularly struck after all the 
23 thousands of witnesses that I have listened to and examined 
24 myself and cross examined myself of the clarity with which 
25 Mrs. Hones testified. I note that clarity in comparison to the 
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1 failure to recall on the part of Mr. Garside. Mrs. Hone was 
2 absolutely crystal clear, "I cannot guarantee this project unless 
3 I receive another $10,000." 
4 I find specifically that in result of that statement, 
5 Mrs. Hone contacted Mr. Boyack, her attorney. It is the only 
6 rational thing that anyone in Mrs. Hone's position would have 
7 done. Her contacting Mr. Boyack makes perfectly good sense, and 
8 regardless of which cape he was going around, Counsel, she did 
9 make that contact through his office. Apparently it started out 
10 by email, but it was not completed until Mr. Boyack came back to 
11 the United States. 
12 Therefore, the recitation by Mr. Garside that he did 
13 not recall ever making a statement like that seems to be 
14 substantially outweighed by the actions and the testimony of 
15 Mrs. Hone and the subsequent actions of Mr. Boyack, and the 
16 payment of the check for $8743. The Court specifically finds 
17 that upon payment of that check that a warranty was bought. 
18 There's no question in my mind that a warranty was purchased. 
19 That is further supported by the behavior of the parties 
20 after that event. Additional work that was not billed by 
21 Advanced Shoring was conducted beyond the work of November of 
22 2006. Advanced Shoring went back to the project in the summer of 
23 2007 and began the additional work. No statements were sent for 
24 that additional work. 
25 It is clear to the Court that Advanced Shoring was 
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1 operating under the assumption that there was a warranty, and 
2 that the Hones, while they may have been unreasonable expectant 
3 that there would be a warranty prior to the fateful call, 
4 thereafter and following the payment of the additional 
5 compensation above and beyond the signed contract that Mr. Boyack 
6 had executed in their behalf, there was indeed a contract that 
7 included a warranty. 
8 Now the Court is going to pay some specific attention to 
9 the very good arguments of Mr. White with respect to the statute 
10 of frauds. As Counsel know, and people in the courtroom know, 
11 I've got two flat screens up here in front of me. On this side 
12 is the one that's connected to the courtroom. On this side is my 
13 computer flat screen. During the course of these proceedings I 
14 brought up Title 25 of the Utah Code and the statute of frauds. 
15 I brought up also all the appurtenant cases decided under Title 
16 25 and the statute of frauds. 
17 I specifically find that this warranty probably is 
18 outside the statute of frauds because it could have and should 
19 have been accomplished within one year of the completion of the 
20 work in November of 2006. A non-statute of frauds warranty, if 
21 there is a reguirement of warranty to be completed within one 
22 year could have and should have been concluded by November of 
23 2007. 
24 In addition, I note that there is some case law that 
25 would indicate the extension of a warranty like this must be by 
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clear and convincing evidence, not merely a preponderance of the 
evidence. My other findings are based upon a preponderance of 
this -- of the evidence, but as to this warranty, again, I 
reemphasize the experience of this trial judge, my experience in 
the trial courtrooms of this state, and the absolute clarity and 
overpowering weight of the testimony of Mrs. Hone regarding this 
conversation. I am clearly convinced as to the extension of the 
offer for-warranty and the acceptance thereby through the payment 
of the additional check. It's not a full $10,000. It's less 
than that. The subsequent behavior of the parties as I've noted 
is satisfactory to me. 
This is a case that is about contract and warranty, 
as I've earlier indicated. It doesn't have anything to do 
with negligence. It doesn't have anything to do with negligent 
misrepresentation, but it is the warranty and contract itself. 
The Court finds specifically the contract was breached. The 
contract was breached by the failure to place the brackets on 
the 14 uncompleted piers on the exterior of the home. 
There was evidence regarding the alleged source of the 
direction to leave the project. The person making that statement 
was never brought before the Court. That statement was hearsay, 
was received by the Court not to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted, but to explain the behavior of Mr. Danfors. Without 
that testimony, from the witness who would bring that in in a 
non-hearsay fashion, that's not part of the record. It has to be 
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1 excluded, and so basically the departure of the defendant from 
2 the project is unexplained and must be laid squarely at the feet 
3 of Advanced Shoring. The Court can only find that they 
4 voluntarily left the project. 
5 That is underscored by the equally convincing testimony 
6 of Mr. Hone about the events on the inspection in the entry way 
7 of the home. Mr. Hone was very clear that Mr. Danfors basically 
8 said, "Wow, I didn't realize it was this bad. I'm going to have 
9 to call my insurance company. I can't afford to do this." The 
10 departure from the project after that makes more sense, and is 
11 the only evidence that the Court has before it on that issue. 
12 Was the contract breached? Well, it was breached 
13 because the brackets were not installed and the work was stopped. 
14 The contract also was breached because the apparent failure of 
15 the bulbs on the interior piers or the absence entirely of the 
16 bulbs on the interior piers, and I find that Mr. Stanforth's 
17 testimony is compelling that when he drilled out the garage floor 
18 around the pier that was placed in the garage next to the broken 
19 pipe that there was no evidence of any grout material forming a 
20 bulb there. 
21 There was no picture evidence. Mr. Stanforth's 
22 testimony was absolutely clear that he removed the concrete 
23 floor, he didn't remove any bulb. So that wasn't there, and 
24 there's other evidence in the photographs and the record before 
25 the Court that the bulbs on the rest — at least the eight that 
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1 came up through the floor failed or were not there in the first 
2 place. We simply don't have any evidence other than the fact 
3 that there was a breach in that circumstance. 
4 I'm not sure that the Davencourt case applies to this 
5 one. I am persuaded by Mr. White's arguments that Davencourt is 
6 in fact a new home sale to a buyer and not a repair contract. So 
7 the Court's simply falling back to prior law in the State of Utah 
8 in order to establish what is appropriate in terms of damage. 
9 J Now some comment of the Court is necessary and some 
10 findings of the Court are necessary to weigh upon the issue of 
11 punitive damages, which have been prayed by the plaintiffs but 
12 which the Court has indicated I'm not going to award. Punitive 
13 damages are supported by the seven factors that Mr. Heideman so 
14 ably demonstrated in his closing argument, a general overall 
15 current of outrageous and totally unreasonable conduct before the 
16 award of punitive damages. 
17 The Court is most impressed by the punitives damages 
18 case that frankly is now the law in the United States because it 
19 was a Utah case that the United States Supreme Court ruled upon 
20 where a State Farm insurance company was found to be behaving in 
21 an outrageous fashion in their behavior and failure to settle 
22 litigation, and while the Utah Supreme Court initially and a Utah 
23 jury initially assessed punitive damages of $144 million against 
24 that company, the US Supreme Court cut it back substantially to 
25 no more than 10 times the actual damage award, and the Utah 
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1 Supreme Court came back and said, "Okay, only 10 times, but 
2 here's the limit. We're taking it right up the limit." The 
3 final judgment of the Utah Supreme Court was to go to that limit. 
4 When I compare the behavior of State Farm Insurance in 
5 that case and the behavior of others who have received an award 
6 of punitive damages brought against them with Mr. Danfors' 
7 behavior, there is a world of difference between them. 
8 As you have heard this Court's comments and as you don't. 
9 probably know as clearly as I'm going to place it on the record 
10 now, I find Mr. Danfors' circumstances in this situation 
11 incredibly difficult. He had a terrible problem that he was 
12 facing. I'm not sure that he was ever told about the broken 
13 water pipe, but even if he had been told, I'm not sure by then he 
14 could have done anything about it, and that's just mere 
15 speculation on my part because we don't have any evidence on it. 
16 Everything I've seen Mr. Danfors do in this project by 
17 coming back down, by responding reasonably to the letters in 
18 Exhibits 3 through 7, in that correspondence back and forth, 
19 everything that I have seen him do, while it supports my finding 
20 of the warranty, it's a man making a good faith effort to do what 
21 he can until he ran right up into something that he couldn't do 
22 anymore, and apparently didn't get any insurance help after it, 
23 and had to abandon the project. That will have an unfortunate 
24 consequence for Mr. Danfors, but that does not rise to the level 
25 of punitive damages, and I simply cannot find punitive damages 
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here, even though they were so ably and artfully argued by 
Counsel for the plaintiff. I just don't find that behavior 
(inaudible) preponderance of the evidence. 
But I must calculate damages. I have a hard figure of 
the value of the home in 2006 — December of 2006 before the 
problems came back again of $320,000. I also know from the 
testimony of Mrs. Hone that the Hones had borrowed 160,000 of 
that value when they bought the home. They hadn't bought the 
home that long in advance, only a couple of years before. So 
their actual equity in the property was $160,000. 
Because we don't have the mortgage company here as a 
party to the litigation, I'm going to have to reduce the value of 
320 by the 160 — cut that in half because that's the actual 
worth of the home to the Hones. Counsel? 
MR. HEIDEMAN: Your Honor, the only reason I'm standing 
is because in the rebuttal or reply I was going to argue two 
specific facts that I think the Court has testimony on just --
and I'll just call it to the Court's attention. There was 
testimony that the payments on the mortgage were $1800 per month, 
and that those mortgage payments were made every single month. 
THE COURT: I also had Mrs. Hone's testimony that she 
put $120,000 into the house. 
MR. HEIDEMAN: Correct. 
THE COURT: What I don't have, Counsel, is sufficient 
evidence in the record to tell me how much of that was principal, 
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was, 
a consequence, I'm just 
THE COURT: So $160,000. Now to that I must add the 
damage suffered by the Hones after the failure of the first 
repair attempt. Counsel, your spreadsheet is extremely useful, 
and I go directly to 89-A in the exhibits. Prior to 89-A the 
entry on the second to the last page that is made on March the 
30th of 2007, prior to that the Court finds that those damages 
total up to that point are not recoverable. 
The reason I say they are not recoverable is because of 
the fact that there's nothing in the contract or the warranty 
that would allow this Court to reasonably infer or find directly 
that Advanced Shoring took upon themselves the obligation to put 
the home back into the shape that it was in when they first came 
on the property, absent the damage. So the 43,178.28 total 
cannot be had up to November of 2006. 
On the contrary, however, after that the line item 
expenses shown on the spreadsheet after November are recoverable. 
Counsel, I haven't done the math up here on the bench. You can 
do that. You can highlight your exhibit. I'm not going to 
highlight this one; it's the Court's record, but I've made enough 
reference to it. 
Then I have the other problem because the Hones fixed 
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the inside of this house twice. In order to put it back to the 
inside of the house twice, Mrs. Hone has indicated that she had 
the lost shoe box that showed those records, and in her best 
estimation -- and again, she's a very persuasive witness — she 
had between 40 and $50,000 of additional expenses. That's 
persuasive to the Court. 
When I look at the care and attention that she placed in 
the preparation of Exhibit 8 9-A, I'm firmly convinced that the 
second attempt at repairing the home came up to 43,178.28. So 
Counsel, what you have is $160,000 plus 43,178.28 plus the total 
of the spreadsheet beginning line item entry second to the last 
page, 3/30/2007. 
Now prejudgment interest applies at the rate of 10 
percent per annum. Counsel, prejudgment interest applies 10 
percent per annum, and the Court's very comfortable with this 
date, September 1st, 2007 to date of judgment. So total those 
costs, 10 percent plus costs -- taxable costs under the law. Any 
questions? 
MR. HEIDEMAN: The only other question, your Honor, is 
with regard -- we had made an argument that while they were out 
of the home that they should be entitled to recover the rentals 
that they had, that they were paying the mortgage and rent at the 
same time. The testimony was — 
THE COURT: Have that in — 
MR. HEIDEMAN: The testimony was that it was $1300 a 
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1 month, and the testimony from Mrs. Hone was that it was from 
2 December of — I wrote this down, just one moment. December of 
3 '05 through December of x06, which --
4 THE COURT: That one I can't give her for, Counsel, 
5 because that was prior to the contract. 
6 MR. HEIDEMAN: I understand. Thank you. 
7 THE COURT: All right. Nobody will walk out of here 
8 happy, but the Court's done the best that I can. Thank you for 
9 your good work, Counsel. The Court's adjourned. 
10 MR. HEIDEMAN: Thank you, your Honor. 
11 I (Trial concluded) 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT.) 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH BY .!? 
: i I 
MICHAEL and LANA HONE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ADVANCED SHORING & 
UNDERPINNING, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 080501595 
Judge James L. Shumate 
Before the Court is Defendant Advanced Shoring & Underpinning Inc.'s Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. The Court heard oral argument on the motion on April 13, 2010. 
Having considered the motion, the memoranda, and the arguments of counsel, the Court denies 
the motion. 
Summary judgment should be granted only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
As the Court finds that certain areas of material fact, particularly those relating to the alleged 
"warranty," remain in dispute, summary judgment is not appropriate at this juncture. 
The motion is therefore DENIED. 
DATED this / [ day of May, 2010. 
JUDGE JAMES L. SHUMATE 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
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A. Yeah. 
Q. How long did it take you to move the stuff out of the 
garage that was wet? 
A. Well, I remember we moved a lot of it out on the carport 
and into one other area of the garage, and they were sweeping the 
water out, and it would --
Q. Now when you say we, who was helping you move the stuff 
out? 
lat 
You 
Mr. 
for 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
er. 
Q. 
A. 
The workers of Advanced Shoring. 
Okay. Did Mike help you move stuff out? 
I can't remember if he did or not. I 
It was after work, because I made --
He was at work? 
I made a phone call to him, and I was 
MR. 
THE 
may step 
MR. 
THE 
White? 
a 
arise 
I exi 
obi 
MR. 
HEIDEMAN: No further questions, 
think -- he came 
not happy. 
your Honor. 
COURT: Anything, Mr. White? Thank you, Ms. Hone. 
down . 
HEIDEMAN: Your Honor, the plaint iffs rest. 
COURT: All right. Plaintiffs having rested, 
WHITE: Your Honor, we would like 
directed verdict. If I may, your Honor, 
in contract. That requires that plainti 
stence of 
igation, 
contractual obligations, breach o 
that that breach causes damages. 
to make a motion 
plaintiff's claims 
ffs prove the 
f that contractual 
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Now plaintiffs have failed to prove specifically two --
well, really three of these allegations. First, they failed to 
prove the existence of a contractual obligation that is breached, 
okay. The testimony we've had so far has been that Advanced 
Shoring promised to install certain piers on the property, 
promised to put certain labor and materials into the property, 
and the testimony has been that they did that, that they in fact 
installed these piers. However, perhaps the most glaring 
deficiency in plaintiff's case is the lack of any expert 
testimony whatsoever as to the appropriateness of the work 
performed by Advanced Shoring on the property. 
Advanced Shoring was engaged in geotechnical analysis 
and piering and underpinning work, which is extremely technical, 
and is very complicated. I believe plaintiff's Counsel 
recognized this when they asked Per, the only witness with any 
technical training or expertise, as to whether or not even if all 
the piers had been installed correctly, if the house could still 
continue to sink. Mr. Danfors said that it could. So plaintiffs 
lack fundamentally the required evidence to meet the threshold to 
bear their burden of proof as to breach of the contract. 
Even if we accept that there is some implied promise in 
this list of work that was going to be done on the property, that 
this together would cause the house to stop sinking, which I 
don't know that we can do that. But even if we did, we can't 
prove that Advanced Shoring actually breached the contract 
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because we can't prove that Advanced Shoring -- they can't prove 
that Advanced Shoring actually did something improperly that 
caused damages. 
In fact, all of the evidence thus far has been that 
Advanced Shoring installed the piers, that Advanced Shoring put 
everything in place as per the contract, and that the house 
continues to sink, and so far that's it. In order to meet their 
burden of proof, plaintiffs have to prove breach and causation. 
They have to prove that in fact Advanced Shoring did something 
that breached the contractual obligations. 
So we've been through the text of the contract and we 
don't see anything there. So we have to prove that they breached 
an implied contractual obligation. Now the Utah Supreme Court 
very clearly has only recognized in a warranty of workmanlike 
construction otherwise known as a warranty of habitability as 
recently as -- I believe it was last fall in the Davencourt case. 
In that case the Court went through and specifically 
disclaimed recognizing some of the generalized duties, like a 
duty to comply with building codes, a duty to, you know, perform 
construction in a non-negligent manner, and instead settled on 
duty of an implied covenant of a duty of habitability. However, 
this duty doesn't apply either in this case because we're not 
dealing with new residential construction. In fact, we're 
dealing with a repair. The Supreme Court was very clear that the 
warranty does not apply to repair situations. 
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So we have the contractual obligations. We can't really 
say, you know, that there is any implied warranties that are 
recognized in the law that apply here. We can't say exactly 
where Advanced Shoring breached the contract because they 
installed the piers. I mean they did everything that they said 
they were going to do, and the only witness who's been allowed 
to testify who has any expertise in this area has said that 
everything was done properly. Plaintiffs also elicited similar 
testimony from Mr. Bemis that he did everything that he 
understood with his -- you know, his limited training that he 
was supposed to do. 
So plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to prove 
causation with expert testimony in a case that very clearly 
involves analysis of soils, the insertion of large pieces of 
equipment deep into the earth, analysis of the bearing capacity 
of materials and metals, soils and engineering of piering 
systems. Plaintiffs have to meet their burden in order to 
require defendants to put on our case. 
Now there is -- there hasn't been shown the existence of 
a contractual obligation that would apply or breach or causation, 
but furthermore, we have a big problem with regard to damages 
because plaintiffs admit that they no longer own the house that's 
at issue. So we're talking about property damage to a house that 
is owned by somebody else at this point. 
So we believe that as a matter of law based on the 
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evidence that's been educed thus far, the Court can't find --
cannot find that plaintiffs have any damages in the loss of value 
or a typical property damage type claims because the plaintiffs 
lost the house. 
Now in response plaintiffs have indicated that they --
that the bankruptcy was caused by Advanced Shoring, but there's 
simply no -- that they lost the house as a result of conduct by 
Advanced Shoring, but there's simply no evidence of that, other 
than plaintiff's blanket statement that's that what caused it. 
In fact, Advanced Shoring did their work. You know, 
the testimony as to whether or not Advanced Shoring was asked 
to leave or asked to finish their work is conflicting, but 
regardless, even if we accept plaintiff's version of events that 
they were told by Alan Boyack that Advanced Shoring wanted to 
continue to do their work and plaintiffs testified -- Mr. Hone 
testified that he knew that in order for that work to be done 
inside the house they would have to vacate, for them to tell 
Mr. Boyack that they were unwilling to vacate is tantamount to 
saying you can't do this work, because it's impossible to do it 
(inaudible) vacating. 
So Advanced Shoring leaves the property. Is ordered 
off, leaves, either way we look at it. Then a year passes, two 
years pass, two-and-a-half years pass and plaintiffs decide --
they don't take any -- they don't make any estimate for what it 
would cost to repair the property. They don't hire anyone else 
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to repair the property. They don't have anybody come out and 
look at it to see what could be done. Then the make a conscious 
decision at about the same time that Mr. Hone -- or Mr. Hone 
suffered an injury -- suffered a medical problem that allowed him 
to -- that caused him to stop working. They made a decision to 
stop making the mortgage payments and to let the house go into 
foreclosure. Then they filed the bankruptcy, according to their 
own testimony, in order to avoid a deficiency judgment. 
This -- there's no causal link between what happens 
years after my clients leave the property and what happens -- and 
what happened back when the shoring was performed. So there's 
insufficient evidence to show that Advanced Shoring caused 
plaintiff's bankruptcy. 
When we take plaintiff's bankruptcy into account, 
plaintiffs have no loss of value damages, and they haven't met 
their burden to show loss value damages. Now your Honor 
indicated in a previous hearing that perhaps another theory would 
be recision. Unfortunately that theory also is unavailable 
because recision requires that the parties be capable of being 
put back in the status quo. At this point plaintiff's money was 
given to Advanced Shoring, and Advanced Shoring put it right back 
into the house. That money is not sitting in an account 
somewhere. It was used to buy labor and materials to work on the 
house. Now that the house is gone it's impossible to put the 
parties back to the status quo. 
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So we would move the Court for a directed verdict at 
this stage because plaintiffs have not met their burden required 
by their causes of action as stated in their complaint, and we 
would ask the Court to find no cause of action. 
THE COURT: Counsel, the practice of the appellate 
courts to require appellate Counsel to marshal evidence has 
received much criticism from the bar, especially those who have 
to do the marshaling, but concept find somewhat useful, 
especially on a motion for a directed verdict, because there's 
an area of the evidence that I'd like you to address that 
Mr. Stanton just testified to. 
The contract, as I understand it -- and this is 
basically from Mr. Danfors' testimony, was that the piers that 
would be installed in the interior of the home -- the ones that 
are not affixed by brackets to the footings of the house on the 
outside, that those would support the slab to which they were 
adhering through the core, they would support the slab with a 
bulb on top. 
Mr. Stanton has just testified that when he excavated 
with a jackhammer the garage floor that all he saw was the 
column. Some people would say that that's breach. How do you 
want to address that evidence that I have before me now, as it 
implies your lack of the essential issue in any contract case, 
and that's breach. 
MR. WHITE: Well, I agree, your Honor, let's address 
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that. First of all, Mr. Stanton -- and I don't want to rehash 
too much old ground, but is one of the witnesses that was 
identified more than a year after the close of fact discovery, 
and so this is the first we've heard of his testimony today. 
However, Mr. Stanton testified that he went into this hole with a 
jackhammer. It's very likely -- very possible -- in fact, I 
imagine likely, and we'll hear some testimony later today if your 
Honor decides not to grant the motion that he in fact removed the 
bulb by jackhammering down through the soil. 
However, we won't ever know for sure because no 
photographs were taken, no record was made other than his 
testimony. We weren't notified that inspection was going to be 
made and that we weren't given an opportunity to inspect that 
evidence, and thus that evidence has been completely spoliated. 
THE COURT: Let's look at the other — 
MR. WHITE: However — 
THE COURT: -- situation, and that's Exhibit No. 84 and 
the testimony of Mrs. Hone about the piers -- I'll just use the 
non-technical term -- popping through the floor on the interior 
of the home. 
Mr. Bemis has opined that it's possible that the 
grouting could have left a void underneath the slab so that as 
the rest of the house settled the grout in the coring could have 
been pushed up as the slab -- or would appear to be pushed up. 
Actually, the slab is moving down and leaving the core in 
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place -- the pier in place. But he's opined that it might be 
from a void formed as that particular pier was grouted. 
It is logically difficult for the Court to make that 
stretch that you could get the grout to fill the slab -- the 
coring in the slab but not because it's liquid -- it's not water. 
It certainly isn't chocolate pudding, but it might flow a little 
bit more like chocolate pudding, but I don't know. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
it like soft 
would follow 
you could to 
formed direc 
At 
don't I have 
position? 
MR. 
WHITE: 
COURT: 
WHITE: 
COURT: 
butter, 
with it 
That's my understanding. 
Well --
It's roughly, but --
My father-in-law always said yo 
but that's what grout does. My 
is that it's very difficult to 
u had to make 
logic that 
imagine that 
p off that core in the slab without having a bulb 
tly unde rneath the slab. 
this juncture on your motion for a directed verdict, 
to draw 
WHITE: 
However, with regard 
just said a 
on. First o 
it wouldn't 
Add 
about is on 
couple o 
f all, y 
fill up 
itionall 
breach, 
inferences in favor of the plai 
I believe that your Honor does 
to this particular issue, your 
ntiff's 
have to. 
Honor has 
f things that I think are important to focus 
our Honor said it's difficult to 
the void. 
y, your Honor -- I mean what we' 
it has to be a material breach, 
imagine that 
re talking 
okay. 
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If there are a few of these where they had slight puddling on 
the inside, even if we accept that, which it sounded to me like 
talk -- like listening to Mr. Bemis and on redirect that in fact 
he's just speculating, because he also said it's possible that 
these piers come up through the floor. The important thing to 
remember is that Mr. Bemis is not an engineer. He's not been 
qualified to provide expert testimony in this case, and he has 
not been qualified by his experience to determine what causes 
piers to come up through the floor. He's qualified to install 
piers. 
THE COURT: Not to worry about why they fail. 
MR. WHITE: Not to worry about why they fail, not to 
analyze the bearing capacity, not to do that. He's -- all Earl's 
testimony was, "Hey, this is how I install the pier. This is 
what I did." 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WHITE: Okay. Now the plaintiff's fundamental 
problem here is this lack of expert testimony on the issue of 
breach and causation. Plaintiffs cannot prove what's going on 
underneath this house. They can't prove -- they can't tell the 
Court why the house is still settling with that required expert 
testimony. They can't meet that threshold, and that is the crux 
of the problem. 
Even if we don't draw every inference in favor of 
plaintiffs based on the evidence that's been presented thus far, 
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there is no expert testimony proving that my client breached. 
There's no witness that said to a reasonable degree of 
engineering certainty or to a reasonable degree of geotechnical 
certainty this -- I could say that this work was performed 
deficiently and that but for this deficient performance, damages 
would not have been caused. So we just don't have -- plaintiffs 
don't have the expert testimony that they in fact need. 
They can't -- I mean they have no idea why the property 
is sinking. Mrs. Hone testified that she still to this day has 
no idea why that property sunk. That is a question that has to 
be answered before a verdict could be entered by plaintiffs. It 
has to be this is why the property sunk. 
There are two options. This is why the property sunk, 
or had you done everything correctly, the property wouldn't sink, 
therefore it is -- and it is sinking; therefore, you didn't do 
everything correctly. Those are the two possible syllogisms that 
plaintiffs have to prove, and they need expert testimony to 
provide them, because when they asked Mr. Danfors, he said, 
"Well, yeah," and it makes empirical sense because all these 
piers are doing is going down and securing to hard layers of 
earth and rock. There are things underneath the hard layers of 
earth and rock, and there are things that change. 
Plaintiffs themselves have provided testimony that the 
house at some times one part was sinking, at some times another 
part was sinking, and just no idea why. Without that expert 
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1 testimony I think we're entitled to a directed verdict. 
2 I THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel, for your careful 
3 analysis. Mr. Heideman, let me give you a chance to respond. 
4 Or Mr. Larsen, whoever wants to jump up. 
5 I MR. HEIDEMAN: Well, even though I realize that most 
6 people like him better -- he's better looking -- I'll take the 
7 opportunity. Your Honor, the response is really simple. For a 
8 directed verdict to be granted, this Court would have to find 
9 that a prima fascie case has not been made, and frankly, we can 
10 do -- I can refute that with just one witness. 
11 At the point in time that Derek Imlay indicates that 
12 there's a violation of law, according to the controlling case 
13 law in the State of Utah, that is per se a prima fascie case 
14 sufficient to survive a motion for directed verdict, at a bare 
15 I minimum. 
16 THE COURT: Counsel, none of the contractual parties 
17 I ever mentioned as a term of the contract that a building permit 
18 would be obtained. 
19 MR. HEIDEMAN: Uh-huh. 
20 THE COURT: That was not a part of the contract. Now I 
21 can see that the contract without a building permit, according to 
22 Mr. Imlay -- and he certainly wouldn't use the Latin -- but it 
23 would be malum in se, but as to breach, you're fairly certain and 
24 you can rest on breach simply because there was not a permit? 
25 MR. HEIDEMAN: I could -- for purposes of directed 
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verdict, I certainly can, but of course the Court needs to 
recognize that we have pled this case in multiple causes of 
action -- contract, misrepresentation, negligence, and frankly, 
based on the evidence, I think it almost becomes a res ipsa 
issue. That's one of the things we're going to focus on with 
regard to our closing argument to the Court. 
We're going to evaluate the law and identify how the 
evidence fits that, and particularly under Rule 14 -- or 15, I 
think the Court has a very simple method of bringing that claim 
in based on the other claims that are already there. 
That having been said, again, we have a prima fascie 
case based on that alone, whether you apply it to the negligence 
cause of action or the contract cause of action. You cannot 
contract for an illegal thing. Although you do not have an 
element of the contract that says we will get a building permit, 
just as I cannot contract to commit murder because it is illegal, 
it is implied within the contract that the contract will be 
performed in a workmanlike and more specifically a legal manner, 
which requires the duties and obligations associated with a 
general contractor to be complied with. 
Furthermore, your Honor -- and this is where I think the 
analysis really comes down. The Yaz case makes this case a prima 
fascie case for multiple reasons, but the one that I'll focus on 
at this time so that I don't give my entire closing argument is 
that of duty. 
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1 j Yaz and Moore v. Smith, and frankly -- although it's 
2 not a controlling opinion because it's not an appellate opinion, 
3 but the decision rendered by Judge Ludlow in the case of Moser v. 
4 Cottam, which follows that, and then the Davencourt opinion that 
5 follows that is an appellate opinion, all of those cases identify 
6 one very specific thing, that the requisite levels of knowledge 
7 held by the parties is what this Court analyzes in determining 
8 the duties that are outlined, and where there is a disparate 
9 level of knowledge, where there is a large distance in the 
10 contractual abilities to understand what's going on in the 
11 process, the Court protects the parties by inferring -- actually, 
12 by requiring that there be a duty and obligation met by the 
13 contractor. 
14 It's -- frankly, it's not that much different from a 
15 malpractice action from a doctor or a lawyer. When you have that 
16 level of particular specialized knowledge, you are in fact deemed 
17 1 to have that obligation to appropriately disclose what is 
18 I relevant and to do your work in an appropriate manner. 
19 Because the duty exists, because it was not performed, 
20 and because there was a violation of law, again, I need -- I 
21 don't need to spend a lot of time, although I certainly can, 
22 going through each and every element. The directed verdict 
23 simply cannot at this point in time -- particularly where this 
24 Court is required to grant all reasonable inferences in favor of 
25 the non-moving party, it just simply can't be granted. 
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1 I would point out one thing, though, that I think the 
2 Court will want to take a look at before we get to closing 
3 arguments, so I'll give the Court a case cite. The case is 
4 Price-Orem vs. Rollins, and it's 784 P.2d 475. It's a 1989 Utah 
5 Court of Appeals opinion, and it is going to be enormously 
6 important in this case, which is why I bring it up at this stage. 
7 Counsel's argument regarding the bankruptcy means less 
8 than nothing. That bankruptcy in and of itself is not going to 
9 I be something that this Court even can consider, and the reason 
10 for that is because anything that happens after the point in 
11 I time that damage occurs with regard to damage calculations is 
12 irrelevant. The damage is what it is at the time of injury, and 
13 subsequent actions just like subsequent remedial measures just 
14 simply don't cut it. 
15 That case is very, very clear, and that's why I give the 
16 Court that citation, because I hope the Court will review it 
17 before we get to closing arguments; I'll be discussing it in 
18 detail. 
19 THE COURT: Did you bring a copy, Counsel? 
20 MR. HEIDEMAN: Your Honor, we actually pulled a copy and 
21 we were trying to grab it, and we didn't, but we will have one 
22 for you after lunch. 
23 THE COURT: If you could find me one, that would be 
24 useful because I sometimes have to multitask up here, and keeping 
25 it up on the screen means that I can't do other things, so a 
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1 paper copy would help. 
2 MR. HEIDEMAN: I will absolutely make sure that you have 
3 a copy after lunch, your Honor. The other comment or element 
4 that I think -- or conversation that needs to be had is this. 
5 Not only do we survive a motion for directed verdict on every one 
6 of our theories, but more specifically I notice that the argument 
7 I is not made with regard to warranty. 
8 Your Honor, we have a conflicting element of evidence. 
9 I We have a party whom I think the Court is going to agree with me 
10 is incredibly succinct and specific and will find to be a very 
11 persuasive and credible witness in Mrs. Hone, who with grave 
12 detail identified the fateful phone call wherein the warranty --
13 I if it didn't exist to begin with -- was certainly confirmed. Was 
14 there an offer? She testifies yes. Was there acceptance? The 
15 check proves it. That was what it was for. 
16 Now we have conflicting testimony on the other side, but 
17 I that's conflicting testimony. The fact that it's conflicting in 
18 and of itself kills the directed verdict. This Court is going to 
19 have to weigh that evidence and make a determination. 
20 As a result, if the warranty is found to exist, and the 
21 fact that there was no repair effected, the only thing that could 
22 possibly help the Counsel or the defendant at this point in time 
23 again is a conflicting evidence statement, and that is whether or 
24 not the Hones somehow precluded the performance of the warranty. 
25 It's going to be very, very difficult for that -- for the Court 
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to be able to find that such preclusion ever existed in light of 
the fact that there is absolutely no direct testimony offered 
whatsoever from anyone saying they spoke to Mrs. Hone or Mr. Hone 
telling them that you couldn't come back to this property. 
It would seem to me that if Counsel is going to indicate 
that expert testimony is necessary to make some of these 
conclusions, that it would be readily identifiable that if in 
fact the secretary is the person who received this supposed 
instruction, that she would be the one testifying, but she's not 
here. Any testimony that might be given as to what she said 
would be inadmissible hearsay. 
So all we have is Per Danfors' comment that, "No, I 
heard it from my secretary." He can't tell us exactly what she 
said. He can't tell us exactly what he heard, but we certainly 
know this. The Hones with again specificity and directness have 
indicated to this Court that no such instruction was ever issued. 
Frankly, but for the way the rule reads, I would move 
the Court for a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff, 
because no evidence exists or can exist that would go to the 
contrary of that element in and of itself, and hence the Court 
will be bound to find that a warranty at a bare minimum exists. 
Then it really is only all about damages, which of course is what 
our closing arguments are for. 
That of course not being a procedural option, and I 
certainly understand why, it's not something that this Court is 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-131-
1 likely to grant. However, it certainly survives a motion for 
2 directed verdict. If the Court has questions, I would love to 
3 answer them, but I have no desire to answer questions that the 
4 Court's not asking. 
5 THE COURT: Counsel, walk through your res ipsa 
6 analysis --
7 MR. HEIDEMAN: Sure. 
8 THE COURT: -- because there is no testimony before the 
9 I Court establishing a reasonable standard of care to support your 
10 negligence claim other than what might be inferred from if it's 
11 going to hold it up it ought to have something to connect it to 
12 I hold it up, i.e., a bulb. Walk through it how we get a res ipsa 
13 argument without testimony on the standard of care. 
14 MR. HEIDEMAN: Your Honor, I'm happy to do that. I hope 
15 the Court will understand that I will fully develop this with the 
16 case law to support it as part of my closing, but I mention it 
17 here because I want the Court to be aware of it, and I want 
18 Counsel to make sure he understands. 
19 One of the key elements of res ipsa -- and I'll go 
20 through each one of them in turn. One of the key elements is 
21 that the issue -- the problem be in the sole control of the 
22 defendant. In this particular instance there is no argument 
23 about that. My clients didn't even live at the house during much 
24 of the major repairs, and during the repairs that they did live 
25 I at the house, they didn't do anything. They certainly didn't 
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that 
has never 
1 pier into 
the Court recognizes that 
1 conditions 
, and there's 
result, it's 
that 
not 
were 
even 
suffered 
been an 
obvious that the 
by 
repairs associated with the property are solely and specifically 
within the control of ASU. 
The 
It's not Mr. 
THE 
MR. 
Mr. Bemis is 
testimony of Mr. -- Earl -- and I'm forgetting. 
Earl, it's --
COURT: Bemis. 
HEIDEMAN: Thank you, Mr. Bemis. The testimony of 
incredibly persuasive in this regard, because what I 
asked Mr. Bemis is, "All the jobs you've ever done -- all of 
them -- have 
floor?" "No 
and dug down 
fact, it app 
area." Well 
the piers fu 
thing speaks 
The 
you ever seen a pier come back up through the 
f I haven't." Mr. Stanton comes out. "When you went 
through the cement, did you see a bulb?" "No. In 
Bared as though it had been washed clear around that 
, the installation of those bulbs as required to make 
actional can only be in the control of ASU. The 
for itself in that regard. 
Court asked a question, and I would offer this very 
simple explanation. I don't have any problem whatsoever 
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believing that it would be very simple to create a gap because 
anytime you fill up a hole rapidly with a slurry type material, 
if it happens to go in fast enough, it will actually create an 
air bubble. That's why when you pour cement you stick it with 
your pole to make sure that you get all of the air out of it so 
there's not pockets of air formed therein. 
It's quite probable in light of what we've heard that 
just didn't -- simply didn't happen if -- and this is the other 
real specific statement, if there was even a shallow area dug out 
to fill the bulb with. Again, specifically within the control of 
ASU. 
Because it's within the control of ASU, because it 
failed, and because ASU's own testimony is they've never seen 
that happen, and the guy that's in charge of doing this is the 
guy that poured the slabs, and because he acknowledges that it 
looks to be that there was a -- there's a failure. If that's a 
pier, that's a failure. In and of itself, that indicates that 
there was a breach in the duty because the standard of care, 
i.e., that the pier never ever comes up through the floor if it's 
done right, was breached. 
Furthermore, when you have Mr. Stanton's very direct 
testimony that there's no bulb here, and the standard of care has 
been established that the bulb is required to bear the weight, 
that's a breach. I think it's quite clear that res ipsa is going 
to establish this, and particularly as I go through a very 
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detailed analysis, vis-a-vis Utah case law during closing 
argument. 
The other thing I wish to point out, your Honor, before 
I sit down, and I think that this goes to the warranty issue, and 
I almost forgot it, but just to make sure that we clear these 
hurdles directly, is the testimony of Mr. Garside. Mr. Garside 
just said something very, very interesting to me. 
I asked Mr. Garside -- and I was -- I went through this 
multiple times to make sure that there was no misunderstanding 
whatsoever. I said, "Did ASU in your experience ever do work for 
free?" "No." "If they went out and did work, did they send a 
bill?" "Yes." "If there was a warranty situation where they did 
work, did they send a bill?" "No." In this particular instance 
the evidence is quite clear that a ton of work was done -- 40 to 
50 to $60,000 worth of work as done, and more work was 
anticipated, the likes of which Ms. Hone indicates are basically 
the equivalent of starting over. We projected that with 
Mr. Danfors on the stand at around $150,000 for which roughly 
58 had been paid. 
I asked Mr. Garside, "Is that -- would that be 
consistent with a warranty situation," and his answer was yes. 
Now your Honor, this Court made a comment that I have enjoyed 
many times repeating to other associates, but I will quote it 
back to the Court. I can make some remarkable inferences from 
that statement. In this particular instance, I hope the Court 
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can as well. 
The testimony it has received, in particular from Lana 
Hone, in particular from Dave Christensen, in particular from 
Larry Stanton, in particular from the city official, Mr. Imlay, 
this is not a hard case, and I look forward to closing. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. Moving party, 
Mr. White, so you get the last say. 
MR. WHITE: Yes, your Honor. I hope to be brief. The 
first problem that plaintiffs will have for the res ipsa claim is 
that they don't have a negligence claim. They have a negligent 
misrepresentation claim. However, they fail to identify any 
information or any alleged misrepresentations that my clients 
made which were negligently made, so they don't have a straight 
negligence claim, and so they can't make a res ipsa argument, 
first of all. 
Second of all, res ipsa only applies where the 
instrumentalities that cause the loss are within the exclusive 
control of the defendant. 
THE COURT: Now I don't want to put words in your mouth, 
Counsel, but what you're telling me is Advanced Shoring had no 
control over what the material was underneath this house, what 
the fill was, what was put there, what the subsurface below even 
the fill may have been. The only thing they had was whatever the 
single core drilling, apparently, that AGEC gave them. 
MR. WHITE: Well, there's not even direct evidence that 
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that's how many cores there were on the report. But even if 
there were, I mean opposing Counsel -- so this is one of the 
major reasons why res ipsa doesn't apply. I mean we see res ipsa 
cases, we see flower pots falling off a window ledge. 
THE COURT: Well, Counsel, you find patients on the 
floor of the operating room. 
MR. WHITE: Yeah, exactly. 
THE COURT: That's my favorite one. People on gurneys 
don't fall on the floor unless somebody messed up. 
MR. WHITE: Exactly. Exactly. It's within the sole 
control of the hospital, and the people -- the doctors and the 
nurses that are there. There's nobody else. There's no other 
factors, nothing else that could have happened. Okay. In this 
case there are literally miles and miles and miles and miles and 
miles of earth underneath this house that could be affecting why 
it's sinking, and Advanced Shoring has control over none of that. 
Now opposing Counsel also made an interesting point when 
he referenced the Yaz case and said that in construction it's 
almost beginning like being a doctor or a lawyer, which is 
particularly interesting because if we are dealing with a case of 
breach of contract or breach of duty with a doctor or a lawyer, 
the law is very clear that we must have expert testimony to prove 
breach, which we don't have here. 
We do not have -- plaintiffs don't have expert testimony 
that says that Advanced Shoring should have done X and they 
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didn't. Why? Or that if everything was done properly, the 
house would never sink, and the house is sinking; therefore, 
Advanced Shoring did something wrong. I mean if this were a case 
involving a doctor or a lawyer, there would be no question, okay, 
because expert testimony is required to prove that standard of 
care . 
Now we're using the term standard of care somewhat 
loosely here because again, this is a breach of contract case, a 
breach of a warranty case. However, even though standard of care 
perhaps isn't the proper term, plaintiffs still have to prove 
that we did something wrong which caused the house to sink which 
caused plaintiff's damages, and they can't do that in this case 
without an expert, and they have none, and they've disclaimed 
having one. They haven't been able to point to anything glaring 
that Advanced Shoring has done. 
We've got a pier that popped up, looks like almost like 
a quarter of an inch out of the floor. We've got -- I mean we've 
got little tiny minor things that we have no idea what they mean. 
Maybe the popping up of the pier is because there's no bulb. 
Maybe the bulb sheared off. Maybe when Mr. Stanton drilled in 
there he -- you know, there was no bulb on that particular pier. 
Maybe he knocked it off. Maybe there was one pier that there was 
no bulb on that was missed, but even is that a material breach 
out of 60 some-odd piers, is it reasonable to suppose that one 
pier that they have evidence -- they have any evidence, albeit 
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disputed, that there was no bulb on this pier, that it's one pier 
out of 60 or 70. 
Mr. Danfors' testified that yeah, if you've got one pier 
or even a few piers that are trying to hold up this whole house, 
and they're the only ones that are staying where they're supposed 
to, they're going to fail. It's going to shear off because you 
don't -- because they're not designed to hold the entire house. 
So we always -- at the end of the day we all come back 
to the fact that they have no expert testimony, and they need it, 
because this is a very complicated case. Breach of warranty does 
not mean strict liability. 
Now Counsel mentioned the breach of a building code as 
being the basis for avoiding a dismissal by directed verdict. 
However, there still has to be some connection between the breach 
and the damages. Even if we can imply that it was an implied 
term that they get a building permit, although I guess it's 
possible the parties could have understood that the Hones would 
get the building permit, because it's just not in the contract, 
so there's just no evidence. 
Even if we did that, we would still -- plaintiffs 
would still have to present some form of expert testimony that 
the act of having the building permit would have prevented the 
plaintiff's damages, and there just isn't any. I mean there's no 
expert who can say, "Gosh, if you had had this building permit, 
somehow that would have prevented the house from sinking, that 
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would have prevented their damages." 
There simply just is no -- plaintiffs can't meet their 
burden as far as whether or not damages -- Counsel's argument 
that what happens after the fact can't affect what the damages 
are, I struggle with that because we have so many doctrines in 
the law where something that happens after again a negligent act, 
which is not at issue here, is affected -- affects because --
especially in contract law because the object of contract law is 
to put the parties back to where they were when they started. 
THE COURT: Consequential damages, the 38th domino in the 
line, is still recoverable. 
MR. WHITE: Well, theoretically out to some limit, but 
yes. I mean your Honor, we've got -- you've got all sorts of 
doctrines that affect damages. You've got consequential damages. 
There's interest statutes. There's a requirement which is 
particularly at issue in this case of mitigation, which again 
happens after the fact. The reality is, the Hones had a house, 
it was sinking before Advanced Shoring got there, it was sinking 
after Advanced Shoring left, and then the Hones don't have the 
house anymore for reasons that are unconnected with Advanced 
Shoring completely. 
So where are their damages? They're in exactly the same 
position they were before the contract was made. They didn't --
they don't have a house. There's no way to put them back in the 
position they were before the house -- before the contract was 
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1 formed. So your Honor, again, we would ask that your Honor grant 
2 our motion for directed verdict. 
3 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. Gentlemen, I appreciate 
4 very much your careful and professional advocacy. Only the 
5 lawyers in here have really understood everything that's going 
6 on, but it was well done and I appreciate that very much. 
7 However, my job is to rule. The motion for directed verdict is 
8 overruled and denied, and we'll hear the defendant's case, come 
9 back into session at 1:45. 
10 Counsel, something has come up that I want you to 
11 consider planning on. I'm going to have to take a protective 
12 order and stalking injunction calendar tomorrow morning. 
13 Tomorrow afternoon is free. Monday morning I have prelims set 
14 now, but those almost never go. Even if they did, I would still 
15 be free for Monday afternoon. Let's look at the housekeeping 
16 matter. How long do you think you're going to be on your defense 
17 case, Mr. White? 
18 MR. WHITE: We have a substantial amount to get from 
19 these witnesses. You know, if I could be completely honest with 
20 the Court, this is my first trial of this size, and so estimating 
21 how long we're going to take is --
22 THE COURT: How many witnesses do you think you're going 
23 to have? 
24 MR. WHITE: Three. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. Each of those witnesses may be two 
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FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGE 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
APPEALED: CASE #20110256 
MICHAEL HONE vs. ADVANCED SHORING & UNDERPINNIN 
CASE NUMBER 080501595 Property Damage 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
JAMES L SHUMATE 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff- MICHAEL HONE 
Represented by: JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN 
Represented by: TRAVIS LARSEN 
Plaintiff-LANA HONE 
Represented by: JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN 
Represented by: TRAVIS LARSEN 
Defendant - ADVANCED SHORING & UNDERPINNIN 
Represented by: GABRIEL K WHITE 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 391.75 
Amount Paid: 391.75 
Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
BAIL/CASH BONDS Posted: 
Forfeited: 0.00 
Refunded: 0.00 
Balance: 300.00 
PAPER BOND TOTALS Posted: 
Forfeited: 0.00 
Exonerated: 0.00 
Balance: 310,000.00 
300.00 
310,000.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT lOK-MORE 
Amount Due: 155.00 
Amount Paid: 155.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFIED COPIES 
Amount Due: 3.00 
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CASE NUMBER 080501595 Property Damage 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
3.00 
0.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 0.75 
Amount Paid: 0.75 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFICATION 
Amount Due: 8.00 
Amount Paid: 8.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL 
Amount Due: 225.00 
Amount Paid: 225.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE: CASH BOND: Appeals 
Posted By: CONNIE LOVERIDGE 
Posted: 300.00 
Forfeited: 0.00 
Refunded: 0.00 
Balance: 300.00 . 
NONMONETARY BOND DETAIL - TYPE: Surety 
Posted By: AMERICAN SAFETY INSURANCE SER (#ASB-523243) 
Posted: 310,000.00 
Forfeited: 0.00 
Exonerated: 0.00 
Balance: 310,000.00 
CASE NOTE 
PROCEEDINGS 
06-13-08 Case filed 
06-13-08 Filed: Complaint 
06-17-08 Judge JAMES L SHUMATE assigned. 
06-17-08 Fee Account created Total Due: 155.00 
06-17-08 COMPLAINT 10K-MORE Payment Received: 155.00 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT 10K-MORE 
06-23-08 Filed return: Summons and Return of Service 
Party Served: ADVANCED SHORING & UNDERPINNED 
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CASE NUMBER 080501595 Property Damage 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: June 19, 2008 
08-25-08 Filed: Default Certificate 
09-09-08 Filed: Answer 
ADVANCED SHORING & UNDERPINNIN 
10-28-08 Filed: Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
Filed by: WHITE, GABRIEL K 
10-28-08 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default 
10-28-08 Filed: Affidavit of Scott T. Evans 
11-12-08 Filed: Memorandum in Oppoisition to Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside Default and Request for Hearing 
11-12-08 Filed: Affidavit of Benjamin D Gordon 
11-19-08 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside 
Default 
11-19-08 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision 
12-09-08 Filed order: Court's Ruling (Motion to set aside default, set 
1/2 hr hearing) 
Judge JAMES L SHUMATE 
Signed December 09, 2008 
12-10-08 Notice - NOTICE for Case 080501595 ID 11777735 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE is scheduled. 
Date: 03/17/2009 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Courtroom TBD 
Fifth District Court 
220 North 200 East 
St. George, UT 84770 
Before Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default 
12-10-08 MOTION TO SET ASIDE scheduled on March 17, 2009 at 01:30 PM in 
Courtroom TBD with Judge SHUMATE. 
03-17-09 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
Clerk: diannem 
PRESENT 
Plaintiffs): MICHAEL HONE 
LANA HONE 
Plaintiffs Attorney(s): BENJAMIN D GORDON 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GABRIEL K WHITE 
Video 
Tape Number: FTR-D Tape Count: 2:17/2:25 
HEARING 
Arguments are heard. 
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CASE NUMBER 080501595 Property Damage 
Court grants Motion to Set Aside the Judgment but that Judgment 
may enter regarding attorney fees. Order to be submitted. 
Counsel stipulates to the Court that they will submit a scheduling 
order. 
04-03-09 Filed order: Case Management Order 
Judge JAMES L SHUMATE 
Signed April 03, 2009 
04-10-09 Filed: Certificate of Service Re Defendant Advanced Shoring & 
Underpinning Inc's Rule 26 Initial Disclosures 
04-20-09 Filed: Notice of Depositions of Per Danfors and Earl Bemis 
04-27-09 Filed: Certificate of Service of Plaintiffs Initial 
Disclosures 
06-08-09 Filed: Noticew of Firm Name Change 
07-06-09 Filed: Notice of Deposition of Alan Boyack 
12-02-09 Filed: Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Filed by: WHITE, GABRIEL K 
12-02-09 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment 
12-02-09 Filed: Defendants' Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Over 
Length Memorandum 
Filed by: WHITE, GABRIEL K 
12-07-09 Filed order: Order Granting Defendants' Ex Parte Motion for 
Leave to File Overlength Memorandum 
Judge JAMES L SHUMATE 
Signed December 07, 2009 
12-31-09 Filed: Fax to Judge Shumate from Lisa Ross (Copies to counsel 
and file per JLS 1/4/10) 
01-08-10 Filed order: Order Granting Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment 
Judge JAMES L SHUMATE 
Signed January 08, 2010 
01-15-10 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment 
02-10-10 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment 
02-10-10 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision Re Defendant's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment 
02-22-10 Filed order: Court's Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment: Set 
1 hour hearing. Courtesy copies 1 week before trial. 
Judge JAMES L SHUMATE 
Signed February 22, 2010 
03-01-10 Notice - NOTICE for Case 080501595 ID 12796452 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT is scheduled. 
Date: 04/13/2010 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Courtroom 3D 
St. George Courthouse 
206 West Tabernacle 
St. George, UT 84770 
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CASE NUMBER 080501595 Property Damage 
Before Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
03-01-10 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT scheduled on April 13, 2010 at 
01:30 PM in Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE. 
04-13-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION FOR SUMMARY JDMT 
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
Clerk: janaj 
PRESENT 
Plaintiffs): LANA HONE 
MICHAEL HONE 
Plaintiffs Attomey(s): BENJAMIN D GORDON 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GABRIEL K WHITE 
Video 
Tape Number: FYT/3D Tape Count: 1:43-2:31 
HEARING 
TAPE: FYT/3D Mr. White addresses the court stating his reasons for 
summary judgment request. 
COUNT: 2:07 
Mr. Gordon addresses court stating Plaintiffs position. 
COUNT: 2:21 
Mr. White again addresses the court. 
COUNT: 2:30 
The court takes the matter under advisement. He will issue a 
decision within 60 days. 
05-11-10 Filed order: Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment 
Judge JAMES L SJIUMATE 
Signed May 11,2010 
05-25-10 Filed: Certificate of Readiness for Trial and Request for 
Pre-Trial Conference 
06-25-10 Filed: Notice of Initial Pre-Trial Conference 
07-01-10 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on July 27, 2010 at 09:30 AM in 
Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE. 
07-27-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for Pretrial Conference 
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
Clerk: diannem 
PRESENT 
Plaintiffs Attorney(s): BENJAMIN D GORDON 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GABRIEL K WHITE 
Video 
Tape Number: 3D Tape Count: 1035/10:47 
HEARING 
Counsel informs the court that they are ready to proceed to trial. 
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CASE NUMBER 080501595 Property Damage 
Discussions are held regarding exhibits, depositions, final orders 
and discovery. 
Case has not been mediated yet but may be attempted. 
Deadlines are given. 
this matter to be set for a 5 day bench trial in January, 2011. 
Notice to be given. 
07-28-10 Notice - NOTICE for Case 080501595 ID 13139913 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 12/15/2010 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Courtroom 3D 
St. George Courthouse 
206 West Tabernacle 
St. George, UT 84770 
Before Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
BENCH TRIAL. 
Date: 01/24/2011 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Courtroom 3D 
St. George Courthouse 
206 West Tabernacle 
St. George, UT 84770 
Before Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
BENCH TRIAL. 
Date: 01/25/2011 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Courtroom 3D 
St. George Courthouse 
206 West Tabernacle 
St. George, UT 84770 
Before Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
BENCH TRIAL. 
Date: 01/27/2011 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Courtroom 3D 
St. George Courthouse 
206 West Tabernacle 
St. George, UT 84770 
Before Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
BENCH TRIAL. 
Date: 01/28/2011 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Courtroom 3D 
St. George Courthouse 
206 West Tabernacle 
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St. George, UT 84770 
Before Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
BENCH TRIAL. 
Date: 01/31/2011 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Courtroom 3D 
St. George Courthouse 
206 West Tabernacle 
St. George, UT 84770 
Before Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
07-28-10 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on December 15, 2010 at 10:00 AM 
in Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE. 
07-28-10 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on January 24, 2011 at 09:00 AM in 
Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE. 
07-28-10 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on January 25, 2011 at 09:00 AM in 
Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE. 
07-28-10 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on January 27, 2011 at 09:00 AM in 
Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE. 
07-28-10 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on January 28, 2011 at 09:00 AM in 
Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE. 
07-28-10 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on January 31, 2011 at 09:00 AM in 
Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE. 
09-03-10 Filed: Motion for summary Judgment 
09-03-10 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
09-17-10 Filed return: Certificate of Service re: Defendant's 
Supplemental Rule 26 Disclosures 
Party Served: ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, LLC 
Service Type: Mail 
09-17-10 Filed: Defendant's Rule 26(a)(4) Pretrial Disclosures 
09-24-10 Filed: Pretrial Disclosures 
09-24-10 Note ******END OF VOL I ************ 
09-28-10 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
09-29-10 Filed: Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
10-04-10 Filed: Motion to Exclude Evidence Produced After the Expiration 
of Fact Discovery 
Filed by: WHITE, GABRIEL K 
10-04-10 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Exclude Evidence 
Produced After the Expiration of Fact Discovery 
10-06-10 Filed: Supplemental pretrial disclosures 
10-12-10 Filed: Certificate of Service Supplemental Rule 26 Disclosures 
10-25-10 Filed: Rule 37 Motion to Strike l]the Declaration of Michael 
Hone; 2]the Amended Declaration of Lana Hone; 3]Portions of 
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Pretrail Disclosures and 4]Portions of 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Rule 26 Disclosures 
Filed by: WHITE, GABRIEL K 
10-25-10 Filed: Request to Submit Motion for Summary Judgment 
10-25-10 Filed: Advanced Shoring's Joint Reply Memorandum in Support of 
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Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Strike 
11-02-10 Filed: Combined Memorandum in Opposition to Rule 37 Motion to 
Strike and Motion to Exclude Evidence Produced After the 
Expiration of Fact Discovery 
11-12-10 Filed: Advanced Shoring's Joint Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Rule 37 Motion to Strike: 1) The Declaration of Michael Hone; 
2) The Amended Declaration of Lana Hone; 3) Portions of 
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Pretrial Disclosures; and 4) 
...Discovery 
11-12-10 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision Re: Advanced Shoring's 
Rule 37 Motion to Strike: 1) The Declaration of Michael Hone; 
2) The Amended Declaration of Lana Hone; 3) Portions of 
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Disclosures; and 4) Portions 
of...Disco very 
11-17-10 Filed: Stipulated Joint Motion for Judicial Mediation 
Filed by: WHITE, GABRIEL K 
11-30-10 Note: PTC on 12-15-calendared incorrectly- should have been the 
14th„, counsel called & stipulated to vacate 12-15-10 and have 
PTC and additional motions heard on 12-14-10 at 2 pm 
11-30-10 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE/MOTIONS rescheduled on December 14, 2010 at 
02:00 PM Reason: Stipulation of counsel. 
12-01-10 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE Modified. 
Reason: Stipulation of counsel 
12-01-10 PRETRIAL CONF/PENDIN MOTS scheduled on December 14, 2010 at 
02:00 PM in Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE. 
12-14-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRETRIAL CONF/PENDING MOTION 
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
Clerk: trudyg 
PRESENT 
Plaintiffs Attorney(s): JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN 
TRAVIS LARSEN 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GABRIEL K WHITE 
Audio 
Tape Number: 3D Tape Count: 2:09-3:15 
HEARING 
This matter comes before the Court re: Motion in Limine, Motion 
to Strike, and Motion for Summary Judgment. 
COUNT: 2:12 
Opening briefs are made. The Court overrules and denies the 
Motion in Limine and Motion to Strike without prejudice. 
COUNT: 2:19 
Arguments are made; and Motion for Summary Judgment is over-ruled 
and denied. 
COUNT: 3:09 
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Court recommends resolving this matter; counsel have stipulated to 
Mediation and state that they have submitted a Stipulation to 
Submit to Judicial Stipulation. 
Mediation Judge's Scheduling Clerk to schedule Mediation Hearing 
for 1/2 day, and send notice before trial on 1/24/10. Counsel to 
prepare and submit Mediation Brief to Mediating Judge. 
12-21-10 Notice - NOTICE for Case 080501595 ID 13470000 
MEDIATION is scheduled. 
Date: 01/07/2011 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Courtroom 2A 
St. George Courthouse 
206 West Tabernacle 
St. George UT, UT 84770 
Before Judge: ERIC A LUDLOW 
Judge Ludlow will conduct mediation in this matter. The 5 day 
bench trial is scheduled to begin 1-24-11 with Judge Shumate 
12-21-10 MEDIATION scheduled on January 07, 2011 at 09:00 AM in 
Courtroom 2A with Judge LUDLOW. 
12-21-10 Filed: Notice of Mediation 
01-07-11 Note: **Medation: Off record. Settlement/ agreement not 
reached. 
01-13-11 Filed: Certificate of Service of Subpoenas 
01-19-11 Filed: Trial Brief 
01-21-11 Filed: Acceptance of Service (Boyack subpoena) 
01-24-11 Minute Entry - Minutes for BENCH TRIAL (DAY 1) 
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
Clerk: michellh 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s): MICHAEL HONE 
LANA HONE 
Defendant(s): PIER DANSFORS 
Plaintiffs Attorney(s): TRAVIS LARSEN 
JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GABRIEL K WHITE 
Tape Number: 3D Tape Count: 9:03/5:00 
HEARING 
COUNT: 9:03 
Opening Statements are made. Exclusionary rule is requested and 
ordered. 
COUNT: 9:19 
Eric Michael Campbell is sworn and testifies. Plaintiffs exhibit 
266 is submitted. 
COUNT: 10:01 
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Plaintiffs exhibit 266 is recieved. 
COUNT: 10:02 
Witness is excused. 
COUNT: 10:03 
Court is in recess. 
COUNT: 10:12 
Court is back on the record. All parties are present with counsel. 
Piers Dansfors is sworn as a hostile witness for the plaintiffs and 
testifies. 
COUNT: 10:35 
Plaintiffs exhibit 263 is offered. 
COUNT: 10:36 
Plaintiffs exhibit 263 received. 
COUNT: 10:39 
Exhibit 264 offered. 
COUNT: 10:46 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 264 is received. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 is 
offered. 
COUNT: 10:53 
Plaintiffs exhibit 1 is received. Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 is 
offered. 
COUNT: 11:03 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 6 and 7 are offered. 
COUNT: 11:12 
Court is in recess. 
COUNT: 11:24 
Court is back on the record. All parties are present with 
counsel. Mr. Dansfors re-takes the stand and testimony continues. 
COUNT: 11:55 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 3 is submitted. Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 and 
Exhibit 3 is received. 
COUNT: 12:00 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 is submitted. 
COUNT: 12:01 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 is received. 
COUNT: 12:06 
Plaintiffs exhibit 5 is submitted. 
COUNT: 12:18 
Plaintiffs exhibit 5 received. Plaintiffs exhibit 6 is 
submitted. 
COUNT: 12:30 
Court is in recess. 
COUNT: 1:45 
Court is back on the record. All parties are present with 
counsel. Mr. Danfors retakes the stand and continues testimony. 
COUNT: 1:53 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 7 is offered and received. 
COUNT: 2:08 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 262 is offered. 
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COUNT: 2:09 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 84 and Plaintiffs Exhibit 86 is offered. 
COUNT: 2:26 
Defense Exhibit 267 is offered. 
COUNT: 2:29 
Defendant's exhibit 267 is offered but entered. 
COUNT: 2:32 
Defendant's Exhibit 268 is offered. 
COUNT: 2:55 
Court is in recess. 
COUNT: 3:07 
Court is back on the record. All parties are present with counsel 
and Mr. Danfors testimony continues. 
COUNT: 3:15 
Defense Exhibit 269 is offered. 
COUNT: 3:23 
Defense Exhibit 269 is received. 
COUNT: 3:46 
Mr. Danfors is excused. Mr. Alan Boyack is sworn and testifies. 
COUNT: 3:51 
Defense Exhibit 268 is received. 
COUNT: 4:51 
Mr. Boyack leaves the stand. 
COUNT: 4:59 
Court is adjourned for the day. 
01-24-11 Filed: Acceptance of Service 
01-25-11 Minute Entry - Minutes for BENCH TRIAL (DAY 2) 
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
Clerk: michellh 
PRESENT 
Plaintiffs): MICHAEL HONE 
LANA HONE 
Defendant(s): PERS DANFORS 
Plaintiffs Attorney(s): JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN 
TRAVIS LARSEN 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GABRIEL K WHITE 
Tape Number: 3D Tape Count: 9:03/5:15 
HEARING 
2nd Day: 
COUNT: 9:01 
All parties are present with counsel. Lana Sue Hone is sworn and 
testifies. 
COUNT: 9:32 
Exhibit 262 if offered. 
COUNT: 9:58 
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Exhibit 8 is offered. Court is in recess. 
COUNT: 10:01 
Exhibit 9 is offered. Court is in recess. 
COUNT: 10:14 
Court is back on the record. All parties are present with the 
counsel. 
COUNT: 10:15 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 89A "Overview Spreadsheet of Receipts" and 
Exhibits 89 through 260 "Receipts" are offered and accepted. 
COUNT: 10:39 
Plaintiffs exhibit 10 is offered 
COUNT: 10:40 
Plaintiffs exhibit #10 and Plaintiffs exhibit #9 are received. 
Plaintiffs exhibit #15 is offered. 
COUNT: 10:41 
Plaintiffs exhibit # 15 is received. Plaintiffs exhibit 16 is 
offered and received. Plaintiffs exhibit 17 is offered. 
COUNT: 10:42 
Plaintiffs exhibit 17 is received. 
COUNT: 10:43 
Plaintiffs exhibit #21 and 22 are offered and received. 
Plaintiffs exhibit #23 and 18 are offered and received. 
COUNT: 10:45 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 23 and 18 are received. 
COUNT: 10:47 
Plaintiffs exhibit #29 and 24 are offered and received. 
Plaintiffs exhibit #25 is offered and received. 
COUNT: 10:50 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 8 through 88 is received. 
COUNT: 11:09 
Court is in recess. 
COUNT: 11:20 
Court is back on the record. All parties are present with 
counsel. Mrs. Hone retakes the stand. 
COUNT: 11:36 
Plaintiffs Exhibit #261 is received. 
COUNT: 11:44 
Defense Exhibit 270 is offered. Court is in recess. 
COUNT: 11:55 
The court is back on the record. All parties are present with 
counsel. Mrs. Hone retakes the stand and continues testimony. 
COUNT: 11:56 
Defendant's Exhibit 270 is received. 
COUNT: 12:30 
Court is in recess. 
COUNT: 1:50 
The court is back on the record. Parties are present with 
counsel. Mrs. Hone retakes the stand. 
COUNT: 2:21 
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Witness is excused. Michael J. HOne is sworn and testifies. 
COUNT: 2:55 
Court is in recess. 
COUNT: 3:07 
The court is back on the record. All parties are present with 
counsel. Mr. Hone retakes the stand and testifies. 
COUNT: 3:55 
Mr. Hone is excused. 
COUNT: 3:56 
The court is in recess. 
COUNT: 4:25 
The court is back on the record. All parties are present with 
counsel. David K. Christensen is sworn and testifes. 
COUNT: 5:00 
Objection to Mr. Christensen as witness remains on the table. 
Court is adjourned until Thursday 1/27/11 at 9:00 a.m. 
01-26-11 Minute Entry - Minutes for BENCH TRIAL (DAY 3) 
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
Clerk: michellh 
PRESENT 
Plaintiffs): MICHAEL HONE 
LANA HONE 
Plaintiffs Attorney(s): TRAVIS LARSEN 
JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GABRIEL K WHITE 
Video 
Tape Number: 3D Tape Count: 9:05/3:55 
HEARING 
COUNT: 9:06 
Mr. David K. Christensen retakes the stand. Arguments are 
presented regarding the motion on allowing expert testimony. 
COUNT: 9:28 
The court ruling stands on accepting Mr. Danfors testimony as a 
non-expert witness. 
COUNT: 9:29 
The court rules that any questions to Mr. Christensen regarding 
his experience will be stricken as expert testimony. Other 
testimony given stands. 
COUNT: 9:42 
Mr. Christensen is excused. 
COUNT: 9:43 
Court is in recess. 
COUNT: 10:05 
Court is back on the record. All parties are present with 
counsel. Derek Inlay is sworn and testifies. 
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i 
COUNT: 10:24 
Mr. Inlay is excused from the stand. \ 
COUNT: 10:26 
Mr. Earl Bemis is sworn and testifies. 
COUNT: 11:07 
Mr. Bemis is allowed to step-down. 
COUNT: 11:08 
Laryy Leroy Stanton is called, sworn and testifies. 
COUNT: 11:24 
Mr. Stanton is excused. Kevin Gurside is sworn and testifies. 
COUNT: 11:40 
Lana Hone is recallled. 
COUNT: 11:43 
The Plaintiffs rest. 
COUNT: 11:44 
Defense requests a directed verdict for no cause of action. 
Arguments are presented. 
COUNT: 12:23 
Motion for direct verdict is denied by the court. 
COUNT: 12:25 
Court is in recess. 
COUNT: 1:36 
Court is back on the record. All parties are present with 
counsel. 
COUNT: 1:47 
Mr. Gurside is recalled. 
COUNT: 2:19 
Mr. Gurside is excused. 
COUNT: 2:45 
Court is in recess. 
COUNT: 2:54 
Court is back on the record. All parties are present with counsel. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 271 is offered and received with no objection 
from defense. Mr. Earl Bemis retakes the stand and testifies. 
COUNT: 3:29 
Mr. Bemis is excused. Defense rests. The court is in recess. 
COUNT: 3:49 
Court is back on the record. All parties are present with counsel 
Mrs. Hone is recalled to the stand. 
COUNT: 3:54 
Court is adjourned. 
01-26-11 Filed: Acceptance of Service (Earl Bemis) 
01-26-11 Filed: Acceptance of Service (Alan Boyack) 
01-26-11 Filed: Acceptance of Service (Kevin Garside) 
01 -27-11 Minute Entry - Minutes for BENCH TRIAL (DAY 4) 
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
Clerk: michellh 
PRESENT 
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CASE NUMBER 080501595 Property Damage 
Plaintiffs): MICHAEL HONE 
LANA HONE 
Defendant(s): ADVANCED SHORING & UNDERPINNED 
Plaintiffs Attorney(s): JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN 
TRAVIS LARSEN 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GABRIEL K WHITE 
Video 
Tape Number: 3D Tape Count: 2:08/5:16 
HEARING 
COUNT: 2:08 
Closing Arguments begin. 
COUNT: 3:56 
The court is in recess. 
COUNT: 3:51 
Court is back on the record. All parties are present with 
counsel. Closing Arguments continue. 
COUNT: 4:16 
The court finds the contract was executed in behalf of the Hones 
by Mr. Boyack with Advanced Shoring & Underpinning. 
The court finds the brochure from Advanced Shoring & Underpinning 
is not sufficient to prove warranty. 
However, with the sworn testimony of Mrs Hone regarding a phone 
call from Advanced Shoring and Underpinning and the additional 
payment made, the existance of a warrant is viable. 
The court does not find negligence against the defendant. 
The court finds the contract was breached by the defendant when 
they voluntarily left the project. There is no proof or testimony 
that the Hones ordered the defendant from the property. 
The court does not award punitive damages. 
The court awards any line items on Exhibit 89A after 11/16/2006 
are recoverable. The court also grants an amount of $43, 178.28 to 
the plaintiffs for receipts lost during the flooding of the home 
and moving. 
The court awards the difference between what the home sold on the 
market at bankruptcy auction and the amount the home was valued in 
the appraisal. 
The court finds a 10% prejudgment interest applicable from 9/1/07 
to the date of judgment. Mr. Heideman to prepare the paperwork. 
COUNT: 5:14 
Court is adjourned. 
01-27-11 Filed: Advanced Shoring's Motion to Strike and Exclude 
Undesignated or Improperly Designated Expert Testimony 
Filed by: WHITE, GABRIEL K 
01-27-11 Filed: Advanced Shoring's Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Strike and Exclude Undesignated or Improperly Designated Expert 
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Testimony 
01-28-11 Filed return: Subpoena and Certificate of Service (Alan Boyack) 
Party Served: 0 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: January 14, 2011 
01-28-11 Filed return: Subpoena and Certificate of Service (David 
Christensen) 
Party Served: 0 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: January 14, 2011 
01-28-11 Filed return: Subpoena and Certificate of Service (Thomas Tadd) 
Party Served: 0 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: January 14, 2011 
02-09-11 Filed: Affidavit of Costs 
02-15-11 **** PRIVATE **** Filed: Motion for Bill of Costs to be Taxed 
by the Court 
**** PRIVATE **** Filed by: WHITE, GABRIEL K 
02-15-11 **** PRIVATE **** Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Bill of Costs to be taxed by the Court. 
02-16-11 Filed order: Judgment and Order 
Judge JAMES L SHUMATE 
Signed February 16,2011 
02-16-11 Judgment #1 Entered $ 289065.54 
Debtor: ADVANCED SHORING & UNDERPINNED 
Creditor: LANA HONE 
Creditor: MICHAEL HONE 
289,065.54 Total Judgment 
289,065.54 Judgment Grand Total 
02-16-11 Filed judgment: Judgment 
Judge JAMES L SHUMATE 
Signed February 16, 2011 
02-16-11 Case Disposition is Judgment 
Disposition Judge is JAMES L SHUMATE 
02-16-11 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 01 -24-2011 
02-17-11 Fee Account created Total Due: 3.00 
02-17-11 Fee Account created Total Due: 0.75 
02-17-11 Fee Account created Total Due: 8.00 
02-17-11 CERTIFIED COPIES Payment Received: 3.00 
Note: 20.00 cash tendered. 8.25 change given. 
02-17-11 COPY FEE Payment Received: 0.75 
02-17-11 CERTIFICATION Payment Received: 8.00 
02-20-11 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 01-25-2011 
02-22-11 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 01-27-2011 
02-24-11 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 01-28-2011 
02-25-11 Filed: Notice of Appeal 
02-25-11 Fee Account created Total Due: 225.00 
02-25-11 APPEAL Payment Received: 225.00 
Note: Code Description: APPEAL 
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02-25-11 Bond Account created Total Due: 300.00 
02-25-11 Bond Posted Payment Received: 300.00 
02-25-11 Filed: Notice of Appeal 
02-25-11 Filed: Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal and 
to Set Bond 
Filed by: WHITE, GABRIEL K 
02-25-11 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay Execution of 
Judgment Pending Appeal and to Set Bond 
02-25-11 Filed: Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Motion and Order for 
supplemental Proceeding 
Filed by: WHITE, GABRIEL K 
02-25-11 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' 
motion and Order for Supplemental Proceeding 
02-28-11 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Bill of Costs to 
be Taxed by the Court. 
03-02-11 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Stay Execution of 
Judgment Pending Appeal and to Set Bond 
03-07-11 Filed: Transcipt of Bench Trial Eelctronically Recorded on 
01/24/2011 
03-07-11 Filed: Transcript Bench Trial Elctronically Recorded on January 
25,2011 (Volume II) 
03-07-11 Filed: Transcript of Bench Trial Electronically Recorded on 
January 27, 2011 (Volume III) 
03-07-11 Filed: Transcript - Bench Trial Electronically Recorded on 
January 28, 2011 (Volume IV) 
03-08-11 MOTION HEARING scheduled on March 15, 2011 at 04:00 PM in 
Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE. 
03-14-11 Filed: NOTICE OF HEARING ON PENDING MOTIONS 
03-14-11 Filed: Joint Reply Memorandum in Support of 1) Advanced 
Shoring's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal 
and to Set Bond; 2) Advanced Shoring's Motion to Strike 
Plaintiffs' Motion and Order for Supplemental Proceedings; and 
3) Advance 
03-15-11 Note: **Certified Copy of Notice of Appeal sent to Ut Court of 
Appeals** 
03-15-11 Minute Entry - Minutes for HEARING MOTION 
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
Clerk: michellh 
PRESENT 
Plaintiffs): MICHAEL HONE 
LANA HONE 
Plaintiffs Attorney(s): JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GABRIEL K WHITE 
Video 
Tape Number: 3D Tape Count: 4:02/4:05 
HEARING 
Printed: 09/12/11 19:10:21 Page 17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASE NUMBER 080501595 Property Damage 
Motion to require the defendant's to file a supersedas bond before 
filing an appeal. 
Arguments are presented. 
Motion is overruled and denied. 
Mr. Heideman to prepare the order. 
03-18-11 Issued: Motion and Order for Supplemental Proceeding 
Judge JAMES L SHUMATE 
Hearing Date: April 25, 2011 Time: 08:30 
03-25-11 Filed: Motion to Approve Bond Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 62 
Filed by: WHITE, GABRIEL K 
03-25-11 Filed: Memorandum to Approve Bond Pursuant to Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure Rule 62 
03-28-11 Filed: Letter from Supreme Court of Utah 
04-04-11 Filed: Objection to Sufficiency and Amount of Supersedeas Bond 
and Memorandum in Opposition to motion to Approve Bond 
(Expedited Rule 62 Hearing Requested) 
04-04-11 BOND MOTION scheduled on April 11, 2011 at 04:30 PM: in 
Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE. 
04-04-11 Notice - NOTICE for Case 080501595 ID 13691432 
BOND MOTION is scheduled. 
Date: 04/11/2011 
Time: 04:30 p.m. 
Location: Courtroom 3D 
St. George Courthouse 
206 West Tabernacle 
St. George, UT 84770 
Before Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
04-04-11 Filed: Notice of Bond Motion Hearing 
04-06-11 Filed: Certificate Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure Rule 11(e)(1) 
04-08-11 Filed: MEMORANDUM REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
APPROVE BOND AND MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
OJBECTION TO AMOUNT AND SUFFICIENCY OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND 
04-11-11 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Apporve Bond 
and Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Objection to Amount 
and Sufficiency of Supersedeas Bond 
04-11-11 Minute Entry - Minutes for BOND MOTION 
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
Clerk: michellh 
PRESENT 
Plaintiffs): MICHAEL HONE 
LANA HONE 
Plaintiff s Attorney(s): JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN 
TRAVIS LARSEN 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GABRIEL K WHITE 
Video 
Tape Number: 3D Tape Count: 4:29/4:46 
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HEARING 
Matter before the court is the plaintiffs objection to the amount 
of supercedias bond and the form. 
Arguments are made. 
COUNT: 4:45 
Motion is overruled and denied. Order for stay is approved. Mr. 
White to prepare the paperwork. 
04-21-11 Filed: Supercedeas Bond 
04-22-11 Filed: AMERICAN SAFETY INSURANCE SER 310000.00 
04-22-11 Bond Account created Total Due: 310000.00 
04-22-11 Bond Posted Non-Monetary Bond: 310,000.00 
05-09-11 Filed order: ORder Approving Supersedeas Bond Pursuant to Rule 
62 and Staying Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal 
Judge JAMES L SHUMATE 
Signed May 04, 2011 
05-09-11 Filed: Utah Court of Appeals Notice 
06-08-11 Filed: Letter from Court of Appeals 
06-23-11 Note: Appealed: Case #20110256 
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FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGE 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
( 
MICHAEL HONE Et al, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ADVANCED SHORING & UNDERPINNIN, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
PRETRIAL CONF/PENDING MOTIONS 
Case No: 080501595 PD 
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
Date: December 14, 2010 
Clerk: trudyg 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN 
TRAVIS LARSEN 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GABRIEL K WHITE 
Audio 
Tape Number: 3D Tape Count: 2:09-3:15 
HEARING 
This matter comes before the Court re: Motion in Limine, Motion 
to Strike, and Motion for Summary Judgment. 
COUNT: 2:12 
Opening briefs are made. The Court overrules and denies the 
Motion in Limine and Motion to Strike without prejudice. 
COUNT: 2:19 
Arguments are made; and Motion for Summary Judgment is over-ruled 
and denied. 
COUNT: 3:0 9 
Court recommends resolving this matter; counsel have stipulated to 
Mediation and state that they have submitted a Stipulation to 
Submit to Judicial Stipulation. 
Mediation Judge's Scheduling Clerk to schedule Mediation Hearing 
for 1/2 day, and send notice before trial on 1/24/10. Counsel to 
prepare and submit Mediation Brief to Mediating Judge. 
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